The limits of statecraft in Juan Donoso Cortés by Rodríguez Ballvé, Juan Bosco
 
 
THE LIMITS OF STATECRAFT IN 
JUAN DONOSO CORTÉS 
 
 
Juan Bosco Rodríguez Ballvé 









M.A. in Governance, Leadership & Democracy Studies 
Instituto de Estudos Políticos 









































The issue running through the heart of Christian political thought is the correct 
interpretation of Christ’s mandate to render unto God and Caesar what is justly theirs. 
Juan Donoso Cortés (1809-1853) was a singular continuer of this tradition. Donoso 
pondered the question philosophically, but also faced it at the highest level of European 
politics, in the revolutionary context of 1848. His legacy is a rationale for statecraft that 
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I. The Crisis of Christian Statecraft 
For Juan Donoso Cortés (1809-1853), Marquis of Valdegamas, politics at any 
given time reflected an answer to an inescapable theological question: the existence of 
God.1 Donoso’s disposition was that of a man of faith. His statecraft bore the imprint of 
Christianity. Characteristically, it was both animated and contained by the limits of 
religion.  
Regarding limits, Donoso construed his political action as taking place between 
two parameters. A foundational or lower limit sanctioned government, whose telos was 
for the benefit of the social whole, part of an order that is created and is good. The 
transcendent or upper limit, in turn, circumscribed the temptations of a limitless politics 
of perfection. In between limits, government carried out its actions invested with divine 
authority. Donoso understood government as society in self-preserving action, carving 
out a peaceful order, so that the Church may fulfil its saving mission. Ultimately, both 
limits derived their normative force from the God who was revealed in scriptures and 
active in history. Grounded in this transcendent worldview, and drawing on this basic 
framework for government, Donoso practiced his brand of limited but energetic 
statecraft. 
 
1 Donoso Cortés was born into the rural bourgeoisie of barren Extremadura. In his veins, he carried the 
heat of his fatherland’s dehesas. Through this imagery, Menéndez Pelayo, godfather of Hispanic 
conservatism, compared Donoso to the other great XIX century apologist: Jaume Balmes. Balmes’ was 
a patient, methodical and rational Catalan genius. In contrast, Donoso’s fiery rhetoric was masterly, 
arresting, and absolute. A precocious talent, Donoso settled in Madrid in 1832, and would soon partake 
in Madrid’s highest journalistic, literary and political circles. Wilhelmsen advises readers of Donoso to 
“set aside all academic and scientific pigeonholing. To the theologian, Donoso seems like a political 
theorist; to the political philosopher; a theologian; to the man of action, a theorist; to the academic, a 
politician. Actually, he was all of these things.” Wilhelmsen, “Donoso Cortés y el significado del poder 
político,” 20; At 23, Donoso joined the ranks of the Ministry of Justice. All the while, he penned 
influential journalistic articles. As a man of letters, he would win a seat at the Spanish Royal Academy. 
Donoso served in parliament intermittently, but always from the ranks of the Partido Moderado. 
Likewise, he served the monarchy faithfully, throughout his life. He acted as private secretary and 
advisor to Maria Christina of the Two Sicilies during her regency, and then did the same for her daughter 
Queen Isabella II. Abroad, he served as the Crown’s diplomatic envoy to Berlin and Paris, where he 
acquainted himself with the leading pens, pulpits and swords of his day. Finally, he met death while 
posted to Paris, at the early age of 43. This extraordinarily diverse range, prolificness, and depth 
constitutes Donoso’s legacy in statecraft. 
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Europe’s revolutionary wave of 1848 encroached upon the very idea of 
transcendent limits that made up Donoso’s baroque political imagination. Following his 
basic politico-philosophical premise—that politics reflected theology—a radically 
different cosmology had brought with it a radically new politics. The historical forces 
of materialism, egalitarianism and centralization came to drive the age. High modernity 
was the time of the steam engine and the telegraph, and of a booming urban and 
industrial society. And also, of ideological party vanguards, leveraging the voluntarist 
masses, eager to command the thriving statist machinery. The God-void was filled with 
optimism and Promethean hubris.2 The politics that sprang from this milieu was a 
politics of limitless utopia.3  
As ever, the political question at hand had a theological preamble. Modern man 
had imagined a limitless politics because he had conceived himself liberated from the 
prescriptions of the doctrine of Original Sin, which is integral to the Catholic account 
of personhood. The basic political truth Donoso derived from the doctrine was that the 
ideal state, necessarily governed and populated by fallen men, was impossible. 
It was clear to Donoso that, despite being well intentioned, modern ideologies 
unleashed the potential for a universal evil by positing the universal scope of statecraft 
with no tempering notion of fallenness. For liberals, contended Donoso, evil resulted 
from faults in institutional design. For socialists, it resulted from unjust social structures.  
The challenge to Civilization lay with the latter. The seeds sown by liberalism 
were reaped by a comparatively resolute socialism. The socialists were willing to take 
liberal premises to their absolute conclusions by actualizing them in society, through 
technology and the state. In the revolution, Donoso could only see a parody of 
Christianity.  Untainted by the Fall, and after the right statist policies had been applied 
 
2 Donoso was alert to the nihilism that had crept-in behind the late deism of the Enlightenment. 
European elites had long ceased to believe in God as an omnipresent force in history. 
3 Modernity’s rationalist and centralizing impulse propelled the industrial revolution and the modern 
state. Both advanced together, levelling resistances before them. State capacity was augmented by 
transformational technologies that spilled over from industry. In turn, industrial power and property 
was secured by the state. In 1814, a steam-powered printing press laid out 1,100 papers per hour in 
England. For the first time, a majority of the population was urban. In 1819, the steamship Savannah 
traversed the North Atlantic in 29 days. In 1830, England had 15,000 steam engines, France 3,000, and 
Prussia 1,000. In 1837, the telegraph was patented. In 1848, coinciding with the revolutionary wave, 
Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto was fresh off the press. Marx was radical in—amongst other 
things—his embrace of the technological race, and his program to reconcile it to the proletariat.  
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through technique, man could launch his Pelagian assault on the heavens. On this 
occasion, it was man who ascended and was made a God, in order to immanentize 
paradise on the face of this very Earth. 
 “From Catholic heights,” Donoso contemplated how the “theological” resolve 
of socialist ideology, the physical momentum of industrial mass-society, and the 
technical prowess of the high-modernist state converged at a single point in society, 
within the state. Church and parishes; orders ecclesiastical and lay; local corporations, 
customs and assemblies, all of them vestiges of a genuinely diverse traditional society 
rich with intermediate bodies, could not resist such vast concentration of power.  
For Donoso the new form of the political, namely, the high-modernist state, was 
an artificial construct.4 It was a device separate from the body of society, foreign to his 
lexicon and understanding of politics. The logic of the state was self-legitimizing and 
self-perpetuating, decoupled from any notion of divine authority. Thus, Donoso was 
keenly aware that he was living through a critical juncture in history when brute, 
autonomous power no longer conceded a transcendent limit beyond itself. This was, 
however, the new basis on which and from which statecraft would be conducted. 
Donoso anticipated, in contrast to his liberal peers in parliament, that the state 
could never be value neutral. Sooner or later, it would be conquered by socialist 
ideologues, levering the masses under the banner of popular sovereignty, and the 
promise of an ever-expanding set of positive rights. The political machine would be 
politicized, ideologized and weaponized against its perceived enemies. A vast secular 
monopoly on power and colossal tyranny would be inaugurated to the detriment of true 
religion. 
Donoso’s concept of political order was overwhelmed by the revolutionary age. 
His philosophy, premised upon the existence of religious limits, seemed exhausted. 
Concurrently, he found himself in an awkward position within the leviathan whose rise 
he was so astutely diagnosing. At the same time, the revolutionary context couldn’t 
possibly deliver him from his acquired political loyalties and responsibilities. 
 
4 The concept of the high-modernist state is derived from Scott “High modernism is a particularly 
sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied—usually 
through the state—in every field of human activity,” Scott, Seeing Like a State, 90. 
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Furthermore, government to him was an organic feature of any human society, 
regardless of the historically-determined form of the political. Hence, Donoso dedicated 
significant efforts to moral discernment. 
The result was a cognitive dissonance. Donoso felt that by remaining involved 
in government he was tacitly perpetuating the totalizing dynamics that had been set in 
motion. In 1848, the state was besieged, and repression marshalled the methods of the 
new statecraft that Donoso deplored. This lesser-evil dynamic took an enormous toll on 
his Catholic conscience and ended up triggering a profound vocational crisis, largely 
underappreciated in the corpus of Donosian literature. The crisis is reflected in a 
manuscript rescued by the Jesuit Carlos Valverde from the Donoso family archives for 
his 1970 Obras Completas. It is worth quoting extensively, as it captures Donoso’s—
more or less successful, but undoubtedly sincere—attempt to reconcile his vocation, 
conviction, and action, 
...I am in mortal uncertainty for not knowing God’s will with respect to me and 
for ignoring what my true vocation is. From here spring...a thousand contrary 
resolutions...With one foot I am in the world, with another in solitude; with one 
in politics, with the other in religion, my soul becoming a sea of confusion...The 
question is whether I should continue taking part in parliamentary discussions, 
or if I should abandon them, and with them active politics, to occupy myself with 
writing for the advantage of others, or with prayer and good deeds for my own 
advantage. The pros and cons are in perfect equilibrium; on the one hand I say: 
I should not retire myself completely from active politics and parliamentary life, 
because in the end some good can be done, and a speech today can be a powerful 
lever; on the other hand I say...it is impossible to limit myself to pronouncing 
one or many discourses, to give them I must take part, unwillingly, in political 
intrigues and...fall under the power of the bad passions that fill that atmosphere; 
being there I have to aggrieve at times, and others be aggrieved...it is difficult to 
close the heart to vainglory, and sometimes to vengeance. On the one hand, 
speeches generate applause, but not good vows, and their effect, if any, passes 
quickly; it is better if I retire to speak to God alone. But later I tell myself: is it 
not sloth recommending this? Is it not possible to serve God in politics as it is 
outside of it? Who says that I am not moved by a restless desire for variety, 
perhaps followed closely by regret? And then...I say: Vanity and the desire to 
feature are the motives that impede me my retirement from parliamentary 
politics; the motives my rationality suggests to me to remain in it are not the 
public good and the benefit of religion; they are the desire to feature in the world, 
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to pose as orator and sage and occupy peoples with my person. As you can see 
[the manuscript ends there abruptly]5 
Today we have access to similar letters sent after 1848, leaning both ways on the 
question of Christian participation in statecraft, a disquiet that continued until Donoso’s 
death in 1853. In his correspondence with some of the finest European minds of the 
time, Donoso confided the possibility of stepping down from public into monastic life, 
to become a modern follower of St. Benedict of sorts.6 Yet in a contemporary dispatch 
to his former mentor François Guizot, Donoso exalted the salvific virtue of specifically 
Christian political action.7 He perceived a great need around him for an energetic and 
socially-minded Christian statecraft. As we will see, Donoso was deeply preoccupied 
by the Social Question, or the issue of the dignity and living conditions of those 
supporting the expansion of mass industrial society at its base.8  
Ultimately, having weighed both the ascetic and (inescapably) statist paths, 
Donoso remained, not without melancholy, on the political frontlines. His definitive 
course of action is represented most faithfully by a letter sent to Count Raczynski, 
Prussia’s Ambassador at Madrid. In it, Donoso explained that he was forbidden from 
abandoning his ambassadorship to Napoleon III’s France by the complex negotiations 
he was conducting with Paris and Washington over Spanish Cuba.9 Thus, in the 
denouement of his political life, the push of the foundational limit of Christian statecraft, 
 
5 Donoso Cortés, Carta a personas desconocidas, 477-478. Carlos Valverde dates the manuscript in 
1850, and deduces from his study of the Donoso family archives that  it was ultimately sent to several 
recipients. 
6 Donoso Cortés, Carta a Blanche-Raffin, 344-345. In Christianity, St. Benedict is remembered as the 
proponent of monastic life after the fall of the Roman Empire. 
7 Donoso Cortés, Carta a Guizot, 705. 
8 The expression Social Question emerged in the XIX century to address the social dynamics after the 
Industrial and French Revolutions. The opening of Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum 
reads “The elements of the conflict now raging are unmistakable, in the vast expansion of industrial 
pursuits and the marvelous discoveries of science; in the changed relations between masters and 
workmen; in the enormous fortunes of some few individuals, and the utter poverty of the masses; the 
increased self-reliance and closer mutual combination of the working classes; as also, finally, in the 
prevailing moral degeneracy. The momentous gravity of the state of things now obtaining fills every 
mind with painful apprehension; wise men are discussing it; practical men are proposing schemes; 
popular meetings, legislatures, and rulers of nations are all busied with it, actually there is no question 
which has taken deeper hold on the public mind.” Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum. 
9 Donoso Cortés, Correspondencia con el conde Raczynski, 945; For a summary of the negotiations see 
Graham, Donoso Cortés: Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist, 261-262. 
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that called to government service, prevailed over the pull of mystical escape from the 
new paradigm of statecraft, towards transcendence. 
Donoso died in Paris just months after his letter to Raczynski, wondering just 
how he could render unto God and Caesar what was rightfully theirs, and not lose his 
own soul in the process. 
A Vocational Crisis, Absent from the Literature 
 We have opened our study with this sketch of Donoso’s existential crisis because 
we consider that it defined the culminating years of Donoso’s life. Without it, his legacy 
in statecraft cannot be assessed in full. Donoso’s crisis is, however, far from central in 
historiographic, scholarly and journalistic sources. The manuscript we have reproduced, 
for one, has not gathered much attention, even after it was made accessible to the 
broader public in 1970.10 Before moving on to our account of limits in the statecraft of 
Donoso, it is therefore appropriate to begin by expounding the reasons for this absence 
as part of a broader literature review. 
The Folk Theory of Donoso’s Conversion 
The cause of the displacement of Donoso’s crisis in the literature is what we will 
refer to as the folk theory of conversion, or simply the folk theory. The folk theory seeks 
to explain Donoso’s winding political and intellectual life by anchoring it in a putatively 
resolutive spiritual conversion around 1847. This account rationalizes Donoso’s 
trajectory into two clear stages: before and after conversion. According to Macias 
López, it was the German Hispanist Edmund Schramm, for long the canonical 
biographer of Donoso, who first introduced the hypothesis of the “two Donosos.”11 
The folk theory constitutes a narrative along these lines: Donoso was a liberally-
trained, markedly Francophile, brilliant young lawyer and man of letters, who 
maneuvered to build a political career amongst Isabeline elites. With time, the 
 
10 As far as we know, it was first published by Valverde as part of his 1970 Obras Completas. In truth, 
it is easy to miss the brief manuscript in the vastness of Donoso’s complete writings, compressed into 
just two volumes in this edition. 




contradictions between Donoso’s Catholicism and liberal politics were resolved as he 
arrived, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the author, but necessarily through a 
process of political and spiritual conversion, at tenable reactionary positions, coherent 
with the essence of Spain’s tradition. This alleged consonance neatly fits the 
presuppositions of the overwhelmingly Catholic set of authors behind the folk theory, 
whose readings are sympathetic to Donoso, and enthusiastic about his conversion. 
Hence, we are left with the dos Donosos: the early liberal and steadfast reactionary and 
Catholic martyr to the revolution.12 Ironically, the caricature that is the “second 
Donoso” is occasionally employed by Donoso’s progressive detractors as well as his 
obscurest proponents with perfectly opposite intentions. 
The common source of the folk theory are two epistles penned by Donoso 
himself. In the first, addressed to Charles de Montalembert, Donoso pointed to divine 
mercy and “the study of revolutions” as the two drivers of his conversion.13 In the 
second, addressed to Alberic de Blanche-Raffin, Donoso described a movement from 
“sterile” faith to a more consequent Catholicism.14 Beyond these primary sources, folk 
theorists advance a triad of external causes for conversion: the impact of the pious 
Spanish musician Santiago Masarnau Donoso befriended in Paris, the death of his 
deeply religious and Carlist brother Pedro, and the sociopolitical ramifications of the 
revolution. Different accounts stress one or the other. 
In his contextual essay, Castro lays out the “problem of conversion” as follows, 
 
12 Considering the “problem of conversion,” Castro has noted that “intellect and faith make up two 
distinct but linked developments in [Donoso’s] new Catholic position.” Castro, “Tradición, decisión y 
moderación: crítica a las tres vías de acceso al pensamiento de Juan Donoso Cortés.” 
13 Donoso Cortés, Cartas al conde de Montalembert, 327-328. 
14 “I was always a believer in the intimacy of my soul: but my faith was sterile, because it did not govern 
my thoughts, nor inspired my speeches, nor guided my actions. I believe, nevertheless, that if in the 
time of greatest forgetfulness of God, I was told ‘you will abjure from Catholicism or suffer great 
torment’ I would have resigned myself to torments, in order not to abjure Catholicism. Between this 
disposition and my conduct there was without a doubt a monstrous contradiction. But what are we 
almost always but a monstrous set of monstrous contradictions!” If quoted in full, it is clear from this 
passage that Donoso would have preferred death to apostasy. Donoso’s “conversion” is perhaps more 
aptly described as a spiritual as well as rhetorical definition towards orthodoxy (J. J. Kennedy described 
the younger Donoso as a “casual Mediterranean Catholic”). In our view, the passage demonstrates rather 
the opposite of what folk-theorists purport it to show. It reveals a fundamental consistency in the basic 
metaphysical premises of the “two Donosos,” namely, belief in the existence of God, and by implication 
a hierarchically-structured universe, the truth of Catholicism, and even a trace of fear of God, all of 
which is not negligible. Donoso Cortés, Carta a Blanche-Raffin, 342.  
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[…] if we assume the hypothesis that Donoso Cortes’ turn is not comprehensible 
through theory nor reason, that it springs from an intimate conversion, the 
division between the young and the mature Donoso Cortés is the same that exists 
between two different authors, so much that they can be studied separately, or 
else the one that is thought genuine can be selected and the other discarded. In 
this way, there is a scission in Donosian thought, an incommunicable 
watershed.15 
Folk-theorists are frequently exponents of the Spanish Catholic right (Castro 
gives the example of Santiago Galindo Herrero and Miguel Fagoaga). Together, armed 
with fragments of the two epistles collected here, folk-theorists have inclined the 
balance of Donosian scholarship towards a putative “second Donoso,” the most alluring 
from this particular position. In consequence, the fundamental continuities in 
throughout Donoso’s political philosophy and statecraft are neglected. 
The Limits of the Folk Theory 
Within Donosian scholarship, the folk theory has irradiated with such force that 
crucial biographical facts, such as Donoso’s crisis vis-à-vis statecraft, have 
subsequently paled next to it. Against the thrust of the folk theory, which imposes a 
second order thread of coherence to Donoso’s life amidst first order descriptions of an 
inflection point, there are deep continuities in Donoso’s actual political life, in both 
theory and praxis. Not least, the notion of limits, which is inseparable from Donoso’s 
concept of statecraft. 
In our approximation to the constants of Donoso’s statecraft, we are indebted to 
the scholarship of Luis Díez del Corral and his disciple Rodrigo Fernández-Carvajal. 
Together, they provide Donosian scholars with an initial intuition of continuity in 
Donoso.16 In his essay Las constantes de Donoso Cortés, Fernández-Carvajal proposes 
an “illative” (as opposed to the standard “traumatic”) interpretation of Donoso’s life. In 
it, he stresses the structural continuity of Donoso’s absolutist mode of thinking. This 
Donosian characteristic had already been noted by more casual commentators. Louis 
 
15 Castro, “Tradición, decisión y moderación: crítica a las tres vías de acceso al pensamiento de Juan 
Donoso Cortés”; Menéndez Pelayo referred to the late Donoso as “the only one that posterity remembers 
and reads.” Menéndez Pelayo, Historia de los heterodoxos españoles, 1519. 
16 Díez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario; Fernández-Carvajal, “Las constantes de Donoso Cortés.” 




Veuillot referred to Donoso as a pilgrim of the absolute.17 Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, 
who for all other purposes assumed the folk theory, also found a constant in Donoso’s 
anti-voluntarism. For Cánovas, Donoso’s suspicion of the will “when he was a 
rationalist thinker, led him to subdue it totally to intelligence or reason, when fervent 
mystic to the holy books [...] he went from the cult to reason to that of God, way safer 
in truth; but always condemning equally the exercise of free will in the individual as in 
the nation.”18 Nonetheless, Fernández-Carvajal’s scholarly work systematizes the 
intuitions of past commentators convincingly and conclusively. In doing so, he shows 
the lifelong continuities of Donoso’s political thought. 
Our task is to demonstrate that there was yet another intelligible constante in 
Donoso’s rationale for statecraft, namely, the pervasiveness of a foundational and a 
transcendent limit to political action. Said limits appear in Donoso’s philosophical 
investigations, in his political praxis, and in subsequent reflections where the lower and 
upper limits act as markers against which to measure his own statecraft. 
Our reading goes against the folk theory of endogenous change in Donoso’s 
political thought. Instead, it implies that the revolutions of 1848 were an exogenous 
shock to Donoso’s pre-existing rationale for a limited statecraft. In response to this 
epochal crisis, Donoso did not always come across as the confident convert and 
reactionary, as in the folk theory. Instead, he was initially doubtful and fragile, 
displaying the sensitivity of a Catholic conscience at work at a time of profound social 
transformation.  
The Broader Disconnect in the Literature 
The dominance of the folk theory and ensuing neglect of Donoso’s crisis reflect 
a broader issue in the literature. We are referring to the methodological divorce of 
Donoso’s political ideas from his political action. 
 If for an instant we were to hold the tectonic plates of the conversation in place, 
we would observe that discussions of Donoso have overwhelmingly dealt with his 
 
17 Díez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario, 525. Veuillot and Fernández-Carvajal point to the 
proclivity of Donoso’s intellect to tend towards the absolute, eternal and unchanging, and not to political 
absolutism which, as we will see, Donoso condemned. 
18 Díez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario, 498. 
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political ideas.19 Ever since his death, these have all too often resurfaced impersonally, 
apart from the socio-political and personal context in which they were formed and 
delivered. This disconnectedness animates our investigation at the broadest possible 
level.  
  Regrettably, addressing the folk theory, whether to accept or reject it, implies a 
level of familiarity with Donoso’s biography that is largely nonexistent in the world of 
political ideas, as well as in its academic and journalistic orbit. In this sense, our study 
is but a particular instance of the broader project of delivering Donoso from cliché and 
overall obscurity. This project consists of attaining a holistic understanding of Donoso’s 
thinking, by rejoining his political life and his political ideas.  
If in fact someone in the room is familiar with the name Donoso Cortés, his most 
common association is to de Joseph de Maistre and the French traditionalist 
reactionaries. This connection is likely traceable to Isaiah Berlin. The most common 
way-in to Donoso today from liberal coordinates is Berlin’s portrait of the reactionary 
Joseph de Maistre.20 Thus, many superficial studies mention Donoso in passing as a 
token, second-rate reactionary under the wing of de Maistre.21 
The scholar of conservatism Peter Viereck lamented this Donosian caricature 
that made of Donoso “merely a reactionary bigot.” Viereck compared it to the “old view 
about Metternich.” At the same time, he deplored Donoso’s “misuse by fascists.” 
Instead, the real Donoso in Viereck’s eyes was “a contemporary of Burckhardt, 
Kierkegaard and Tocqueville. He is not a conservative thinker like de Maistre; he looks, 
like these great contemporaries of his, towards the future.”22  
More recent scholarship in political theory anchors Donoso to Carl Schmitt. As 
 
19 The introduction to Graham’s Donoso Cortés Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist is perhaps 
the most comprehensive and contextual literature review, at least up to its publication in 1974 (This 
date precedes the latest renewal of interest in Donoso, instigated by Schmittian scholarship). 
20 Berlin, “Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism.” While Berlin does not mention Donoso 
explicitly, he was perhaps the most prominent liberal critic of traditionalism. In fact, Donoso’s name 
has been tied to the traditionalists within Spain. Both the progressive thinker and political figure Enrique 
Tierno-Galván and Menéndez Pelayo treated Donoso as an appendix to the traditionalists across the 
Pyrenees. To this respect, the best discussion of Donoso’s relation to the traditionalists is Valverde’s in 
his introduction to Donoso’s Obras Completas. 
21 Professor Spektorowski offers a wonderful refutation of Berlin, as well as an account of Carl 
Schmitt’s appropriation of Donoso. Spektorowski, “Maistre, Donoso Cortés, and the Legacy of Catholic 
Authoritarianism.”  
22 Viereck, Conservative Thinkers, 153-158. 
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the continental Schmitt deconstructs the Anglo-American imagination, ever more 
doubtful of its historically liberal constitution, we can expect that more scholars will 
arrive at Donoso through the via Schmittiana.23 In response, there have been recent 
efforts in order to disentangle the two from scholars in within the Anglosphere.24  
In sum, the Donoso’s association to the French reactionaries by liberal theorists, 
together with Schmitt’s notoriety, alongside his heterodox interpretation of Donoso as 
his own precursor, still weighs heavily upon Donoso’s historiography.  
If we turn back the clock to Donoso’s own lifetime, his ideas were already 
making waves. Take, for example, Donoso’s Ensayo Sobre el Catolicismo, el 
Liberalismo y el Socialismo, his best-known work. During his own lifetime, the Ensayo 
became the vector of theological disputes between the liberal Catholicism of Dupanloup 
and Montalembert, and the traditionalist camp of Veuillot. It became the locus of the 
proxy war between the Gallican and ultramontane factions of French Catholicism. The 
quarrel reached all the way up to Pope Pius IX, who mediated the dispute in favor of 
Donoso, who was himself exhausted by the controversies arising from his work as a lay 
theologian.25 At any rate, the polemic was removed from what the Ensayo had meant 
Donoso himself. Disillusioned by practical politics, he had sought refuge in the Ensayo 
to ponder his theological concerns. The Ensayo, however, had become a throwing 
weapon in political skirmishes separate from his life. 
A century later, a dispute took place at the intellectual core of geopolitically-
isolated Franquismo. Hardline falangistas and technocratic reformers interpreted 
Donoso’s political legacy to fit their respective political visions for Spain. Carl Schmitt, 
who had controversially reduced the Spaniard to a proto-decisionist, was present in the 
 
23 Pastor Martínez, “Juan Donoso Cortés y la teoría de la dictadura.” Pastor points to the academic 
journal Telos as the Schmittian point of entry to Donoso. 
24 In addition to Spektorowski, see Fox, “Schmitt’s Use and Abuse of Dictatorship in Donoso.” In order 
to recalibrate the conversation away from the works of Donoso that Schmitt focused on, for example 
the Discurso sobre la dictadura, an English translation of Donoso’s full oeuvre would be profitable. As 
a matter of fact, in the Hispanic world, Schmitt’s deployment of Donoso is considered heterodox, to say 
the least. Perhaps the finest approximation to Schmitt’s use of Donoso is Angel López-Amo’s prologue 
to Schmitt’s Interpretación Europea de Donoso Cortés. 
25 Donoso Cortés, Contra el liberalismo. 70-82. In the introduction to his anthology, Arnaud Imatz 




As Schmitt himself pointed out, Donoso’s name comes in and out of history with 
every great crisis. It does so through scholarly, literary, journalistic and political 
commentary. It is true that Donoso’s Christian grand narrative and prophetic undertones 
invite appropriation in times of crisis. His ideas, nonetheless, as those of any other 
thinker, must also be understood as part of the political context from which they 
emerged.  
The common thread to the Donosian polemics referenced here—academic, 
theological or geopolitical—is precisely the discounting of Donoso’s biography, 
including his vocational crisis.27 Without it, we believe that his legacy in statecraft is 
only partially intelligible. Case in point, scholars readily forget that the fiery orator who 
captivated European cabinets with his absolute assertions and his penetrative mixture 
of theology and geopolitics, ended his days in Paris quietly, dutifully and skillfully, 
negotiating the terms of the last vestiges of the Spanish Empire, while privately 
doubting his motives for participating in statecraft.28  
Dualism in Donosian scholarship is symptomatic of a larger problem in Western 
academia, perhaps illuminated best by the Alasdair MacIntyre in his classic After Virtue,  
There ought not to be two histories, one of political and moral action and one of 
political and moral theorizing, because there were not two pasts, one populated 
only by actions, the other only by theories. Every action is the bearer and 
expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of 
theorizing and every expression of belief is a political and moral action.29  
In the case of Donoso, his prominence as both a thinker and a politico promotes 
this duality. Biographical neglect is not always the result of scholarly carelessness. Yes, 
 
26 For a study of Carl Schmitt’s deep-rooted relationship to Spain see Saralegui, Carl Schmitt pensador 
español. 
27 Donoso’s most complete biography remains Federico Suárez’s 1997 Vida y Obra de Juan Donoso 
Cortés. 
28 Béla Menczer provides a list of some of Donoso’s friends, allies and readers: “Louis Veuillot, a close 
personal friend during his Paris years, was one of them; Barbey d’Aurevilly did not hesitate to place 
him beside Joseph de Maistre and Bonald as one of the Lay Fathers of the Church; Schelling, head of 
the German philosophers since the death of Hegel, greeted in him a new and unexpected luminary of 
the century; old Metternich did not hesitate to declare that ‘After Donoso Cortes, one has to put down 
one’s pen, for nothing more and nothing better can be said on the historical transition we are 
witnessing.’” Menczer, Catholic Political Thought, 159. 
29 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 61. 
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we have encountered many instances of appropriation for particular political agendas. 
But Donoso’s circuitous life as a thinker and actor, vastly productive in both fields, adds 
to the challenge of parsing him accurately. In addition, we must consider the notoriously 
labyrinthine political landscape of XIX century Spain. Alongside the ideological use 
and abuse Donoso has been subjected to, these two factors have opened a deep chasm 
between the ideas and the man; between theory and action. 
There have been several efforts by Donosian scholars directed at bridging the 
gap between ideas and action. J. J. Kennedy, for one, lamented that Donoso’s political 
biography had been set aside. He stressed that it was “necessary to report the one 
consistent feature of [Donoso’s] career, namely his long record of service to the Crown 
and to the government.”30 But by dismissing Donoso’s intellectual life wholesale, 
Kennedy robbed him of practical reason and agency, falling squarely on the other side 
of the dualism.31 
 John T. Graham, in his highly original Donoso Cortés Utopian Romanticist and 
Political Realist, set out to synthesize Donoso’ intellectual and political life. In doing 
so, Graham set the right direction for the studies that have followed, including ours.  
Finally, the Basque scholar Arnaud Imatz does allude to some of the private 
correspondence that reflects Donoso’s crisis of statecraft. He does so in the introduction 
to his Donosian anthology.32 Yet, perhaps as a consequence of assuming the folk theory, 
Imatz does not treat the epistles extensively, nor consider them critical to understand 
the whole of Donoso’s political life. 
Itinerary 
We have begun by laying out the climatic crisis of Donoso’s life. To conclude 
Part I, we further examine Donoso’s transcendental sense of existence, which serves 
as an upper limit to worldly affairs, including politics. We then consider the upper 
limit’s relationship to the pressing demands of the Social Question, that occupied 
Donoso and the greatest European minds of the XIX century.  
 
30 Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State,” 522. 
31 Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State,” 524. 
32 Donoso Cortés, Contra el liberalismo. 
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Given statecraft’s limited scope, Part II is dedicated to analyzing what the 
effective and normative limits of Donoso’s statecraft are. In other words, what statecraft 
is and ought to accomplish, and what is and ought to remain beyond its reach. We will 
begin by examining the concept of authority in Donoso, the common thread of his 
intricate career in statecraft. Next, we will look at his theory of government as 
“resistance” that flows from the principle of authority. Bearing in mind these two core 
continuities, we consider the question of Donoso’s use of ideologies and political 
affiliation. We interpret Donoso’ political calculus as a form of political realism in the 
Augustinian tradition, and therefore bound by Christian ethics. Having established the 
foundational and transcendent limits of statecraft in Donoso, we arrive at what we 
consider his overriding political objective: preserving the temporal freedom of the 
Catholic Church. 
Part III sets Donoso’s statecraft of limits against the revolutionary epoch that 
erupted in 1848. We collect Donoso’s reflections on the new ideological, technological 
and social paradigm, and spell out the fundamental incompatibility between the 
dawning age and Donoso’s rationale for energetic but limited statecraft. We will discuss  
Donoso’s resulting vocational crisis.  
Finally, part IV ponders Donoso’s metaphysical outlook in face of the epochal 
challenge. We consider his conception of human freedom and its interplay with 
Providence, his understanding of government as a divinely ordained service, his 







God and Caesar, Face to Face 
We write at a time when politics absorbs virtually all facets of life. Everything 
is political, we are told. Furthermore, politics and the state are identified and confused 
with each other. Aristotle’s deep-rooted anthropology of man as the political animal is 
lost to an abstract and statistical man, that is the technocratic subject of the state. In turn, 
the state holds an uncontested monopoly over a growing and seemingly limitless 
number of social issues. Its task, it seems, is to provide a technical solution to all of 
them. Putatively, it has the mandate and the technical capacity to do so.  
As we examine Donoso’s thought, we must be cognizant of the distorting effects 
of the current framework of a totalizing politics, and remain open to Donoso’s 
transcendent sense of existence, and the limitations it implies to the scope of politics. 
For Donoso “God is the ocean that contains and encompasses all things”, including 
worldly politics.33 Statecraft—despite its links to the divine—was an all-too-human 
activity. It always paled in comparison to Creation, revelation and the mysteries beyond. 
Accordingly, Donoso reserved for it a relatively modest place in the Universe. 
In the Ensayo Sobre el Catolicismo, el Liberalismo y el Socialismo, Donoso 
revealed the relative places of temporal power and divinity in his cosmos. To him, 
temporal power was incomparable to the limitless designs of sacred history and its 
Master. Echoing the Gospels, Donoso wrote, 
[Christ Said] Render unto God what is God’s, and unto Caesar what is Caesar’s; 
that amounted to saying: ‘I give you your Caesar, and take away your Jupiter.’ 
Asked by Pilate and by the great priest, he ratified his saying, affirming...that he 
was the Son of God; but that his kingdom was not of this world. Caiaphas then 
said: ‘This man is guilty and must die.’ And Pilate on the contrary: ‘Let this man 
free, because he is innocent.’ Caiaphas, the great priest, looked at the question 
from the religious point of view; Pilate, a man of laws, looked at the question 
from the political point of view. Pilate could not fathom what the State had to do 
with religion, Caesar with Jupiter, politics with theology; Caiaphas, on the 
contrary, thought that a new religion would upset the State, that a new God would 
dethrone the Caesar, and that the political question came enveloped in the 
 
33 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 499. The Ensayo contains 
a unified vision of “religious,” “social” and “political” problems, and the corresponding religious, social 
and political truths. Donoso considers theology the most extensive level at which political problems 
must be interpreted, addressed and adjudicated. Particular applications follow from this fundamental 
treatment of the issues.  
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theological question. The mob thought instinctively like Caiaphas...and called 
Pilate an enemy of Tiberius.34 
Donoso took special interest in the figure of the High Priest Caiaphas. Like 
Caiaphas in the passage, Donoso recognized that the ancient route from the contingent 
to the eternal was not fundamentally political but religious. All political orders 
eventually decayed. Caiaphas guarded zealously from the potential challenger creed, 
precisely because he was sensitive to the true nature of the route to the eternal. Sensing 
the messianic potential before him in Christ, Caiaphas moved swiftly to placate it. 
Oppositely, Pilate, the archetype of the secular magistrate, could not fathom the primacy 
of the sacred over the political, at his own peril, and to his demise. The distinction 
between the spiritual and temporal spheres simply did not exist for Pilate. The worship 
of the gods was merely one of the things that the Roman ruler ordered to the common 
good. In a moment, he sought to absolve himself from moral responsibility by washing 
his hands. The meek became strong, and the delegate of Tiberius and the power of pagan 
Rome was swept away by providential forces.35 Donoso never abandoned Caiaphas’ 
insight. It remained the cornerstone of his deeply theological political imagination.  
If we consider Donoso’s work in whole, the scene at Pilate’s court is more than 
a momentous event in the history of Redemption. It is also the key moment through 
which the rest of political history takes on meaning. No subsequent political process 
can match the limitless transformational potential of the Incarnation. The radical 
humility of its challenge to the Imperium modified the sources of potestas and 
auctoritas forever. In Donoso’s words, 
 
34 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 507. 
35 For Donoso, Christianity was profoundly subversive of temporal power to the extent that it 
subordinated it to a higher law “From the sacrifice of the cross flow those portentous energies with 
which the weak amazed the strong, with which the outcast and unarmed climbed to the Capitol, with 
which some poor fishermen overcame the world,” affirmed Donoso. Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el 
catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 688; Indeed, the Christ nailed to the Cross differed greatly 
from the Messiah that Caiaphas would have expected to restore the Davidic kingdom. In contrast to 
Donoso, Friedrich Nietzsche rescued the figure of Pilate in The Anti-Christ: “Must I add that, in the 
whole New Testament, there appears but a solitary figure worthy of honor? Pilate, the Roman viceroy. 
To regard a Jewish imbroglio seriously—that was quite beyond him. One more Jew or less—what did 
it matter? The noble scorn of a Roman, before whom the word ‘truth’ was shamelessly mishandled, 
enriched the New Testament with the only saying that has any value—and that is at once its criticism 
and its destruction: ‘What is truth?’” Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 45; Donoso instead focused on 
Caiaphas, insofar as Caiaphas understood the power of the forces being unleashed by Christ, above and 
beyond Pilate.  
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Christianity has not destroyed anything and has changed the face of all things. 
Opposite to revolutions, that begin by writing down the tables of rights, it has 
written for all the code of duties. It never speaks to the Caesar but to remind him 
the he is answerable to God and that he is consecrated to the service of the 
peoples; nor with the masses but to teach her she owes obedience to he Caesar; 
the doctrine of active obedience sanctifies authority; that of passive resistance 
sanctions human freedom that is not prescribable.36 
Christianity is the true and legitimate revolution. It has touched everything. It has 
made authority strong because it has given it a divine source—nulla potestas nisi a 
Deo—, and yet it has made it gentle by imposing upon it the limits of Christian justice. 
The indirect subordination of temporal power to the higher authority of God is, in this 
sense, revolutionary.  
Donoso claimed that “the distinction between civil and religious power, between 
God and Caesar, between the pontiff and the king, was a most fecund truth, unknown 
to the peoples until the Catholic Church revealed it to the world.”37 All the while, we 
ought to render unto Caesar what is his, steering clear of idolatry, so long as temporal 
authority remains within the bounds of legitimacy. 
Latent Metaphysical Forces in History 
The forces present in Donoso’s exposition of the Gospels do not exit history after 
the Resurrection. Indeed, they are manifest in two ways, the first of which is Providence. 
The God of Donoso was not a vague deity, but rather an intervening God. In fact, history 
for Donoso was the great tapestry that records the interplay of Divine Providence and 
free will.38 Along these lines, Donoso saw the hand of Providence behind modernity’s 
revolutions. “The prudence of Europe in Utrecht,” wrote Donoso, “faltered for thinking 
about what matters little: in forming an artificial and ephemeral equilibrium by means 
of renunciations, segregations and aggregations of territories. It did not consider what 
matters a lot: an agent of providence that had to come, whose germs were fecundating 
on earth; in the rapid, instantaneous, providential expulsion of revolutions.”39 The 
 
36 Donoso Cortés, Curso de historia de la civilización de España, 24-25. We have translated 
“answerable” from the Spanish justiciable, meaning the rendering of justice 
37 Donoso Cortés, Pío IX, 199. 
38 Donoso Cortés, Estudios sobre la historia. Exposición a S. M. Isabel II, 199. 
39 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre los regios enlaces, 151. 
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politics of equilibrium was destined to stumble. “It looks like God, in making man king 
of the dominion of the sciences, subtracted from his power and jurisdiction one alone: 
the science of equilibrium,” concluded Donoso in the Ensayo.40 
Donoso thought that the second way in which these forces were latent in history 
was through our fundamentally religious anthropologies. With the God of Gospels out 
of the picture, other deities would take His place, preying on our very nature. While 
ideologies prided themselves on being secular, they maintained a religious structure 
both metaphysically and internally. Revolutions came with their own gods, saints and 
sinners.  In light of this, Donoso famously opened the Ensayo with the subtitle How a 
great question of theology is always involved in every great political question.41 
Victorious amongst these ideologies was socialism. Its strength arose precisely from its 
theological structure, and its promise of a worldly eschatology.42  
Thus, during the revolutions of 1848, Providence in conjunction with the 
exercise of free will, together with our anthropological religiosity, were at play. Donoso 
foresaw a new and formidable challenge to the European equilibrium, in its 
configuration at the time, namely, the Concert of Europe.43 The challenge lay with the 
compounded forces of revolution and socialist ideology that took the world stage in 
1848. According to Donoso, the wondrous revolutionary force of Christianity had found 
its perverse inversion in the “satanic theology” of socialism, 
 
40 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 639. 
41 Donoso then addresses Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who had reached a symmetrical conclusion from the 
antipodes of militant atheism “Proudhon has written in his Confessions of a revolutionary these notable 
words: ‘It is admirable how in all our political questions we always come across theology.’ There is 
nothing here that may elicit surprise, but the surprise of Proudhon. Theology, insofar as it is the science 
of God, is the ocean that contains and envelops all sciences, just as God is the ocean that contains and 
envelops all things.” Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 499; 
Karl Löwith referred to the dispute as so “Thus an austere believer like Donoso Cortés could see in 
Proudhon an archenemy whose revolutionary thesis had to be refuted on theological grounds.” Löwith, 
Meaning in History, 65. 
42 “Profound revolutions were always made by opulent aristocrats. The seed of revolution is not in 
slavery or misery; the seed of revolution is in the desires of the mob over-excited by the tribunes that 
exploit it and benefit. And you shall be like the rich: see there the formula of the socialist revolutions 
against the middle classes. And you shall be like the nobles: see there the formula of the revolutions of 
middle classes against the nobiliary classes. And you shall be like kings: see there the formula of the 
revolutions of the nobliary classes against the kings. Finally, and you shall be like gods: see there the 
formula of the first rebellion of man against God. Since Adam, the first rebel, to Proudhon, the last 
impío, that is the formula of all revolutions.” Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 311-312.  
43 The Concert of Europe was the system of European balance-of-power politics throughout the XIX 
century and leading up to WWI. 
19 
 
The socialist schools, ignoring the barbarous multitudes which follow them, and 
considered in their doctors and masters, are far superior to the Liberal school, 
because they go straight to all the great problems and questions, and because 
they always propose a peremptory and decisive solution. Socialism is not strong 
but as a satanic theology. and it is destructive, only because it is a satanic 
theology. The socialist schools, inasmuch as they are theological, will prevail 
over the liberal school, inasmuch as this one is anti-theological and skeptical, 
and inasmuch as [the socialist schools] are satanic, they will succumb before the 
Catholic school, which is at once theological and divine. [The socialists’] 
instincts must be in accord with our assertions, if we consider that they treasure 
up their hatred for Catholicism, while they have only contempt for Liberalism.44 
Donoso premised that liberalism, in all its irresoluteness, was condemned to be 
a historical anecdote: a mere prelude to socialism.45 How could it resist the sheer 
physical force of the theological, technological, voluntarist, and statist wave? Again, 
for Donoso, the eschatological—both in its good and evil manifestations—towered over 
Pilate and the power brokers of all ages. 
Soon, Proudhon’s revolutionary heirs would command the state’s new 
machinery. Christian freedom, namely, free will, would survive as an ontologically 
inextinguishable divine attribute. But bourgeois political freedoms and liberties would 
perish.46 This recognition set the distinctive tone of Donoso’s melancholic statecraft. 
Unlike Pilate, Donoso had an absolute concept of truth. Just as Caiaphas had sensed the 
potential in Christ during his trial, Donoso sensed in the theological structure of 
socialism its total challenge to Christianity. All the while, Donoso was self-aware that 
 
44 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 597. 
45 Elio Gallego García dates the death of liberalism in 1914. “In the XIX century a liberal was he who 
believed in an effective separation of powers, in limited suffrage, in the existence of recognized and 
guaranteed individual rights, in strong governments with small administrations, in respect for private 
property and freedom of commerce and contracts, in low taxes approved by parliaments made up of 
qualified representatives that were in general propertied and in the freedom of the press, religion and 
discussion, normally in the bosom of constitutional monarchies. Few equivocities existed in this 
concept, which is not true for the idea of democracy. Assuming this, we ought to ask ourselves, do 
liberal democracies exist? We dare to give a negative response. Liberalism as a doctrine and an attitude 
is anterior to mass society and, in fact, [mass society] is extraneous if not overtly hostile to 
[liberalism].”Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 15; Similarly, it is questionable whether the “liberal 
international order” that emerged from the ashes of Second World War has heretofore rested on liberal 
dispositions, principles and ideas, firmly upheld by Western citizens, or rather on the ideological and 
economic hegemony of the United States, as well as its capacity to underwrite global security.  
46 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 315. We may distinguish between two types of freedom 
in Donoso. Man is endowed with metaphysical freedom, or free will, by his Creator. Political freedom 
is enjoyed by certain societies, but it is everywhere an emergent property of obedience to authority. “La 
libertad no es otra cosa que la facultad de obedecer,” said Donoso, echoing the Roman statesman 
Cicero. Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 383.  
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he could not rekindle the flame of Christianity—the only possible dyke to the advance 
of socialism—from the magistrature. The transcendent limit had been undone for 
Christian civilization. 
The Social Question  
Donoso’s rationale for a limited statecraft includes the notion that politics should 
not be the vector for earthly perfection, redemption or salvation as the immanentist 
conception of politics would have us believe. Donoso’s prominence as a political figure, 
nonetheless, often belies the fact that in his final analysis, the solution to the Social 
Question lay with religion and not politics. The beginning and the end of the Social 
Question could not possibly lie within the province of government, in the same way that 
the ultimate ends of man were above and beyond politics.47  
For Donoso, government action could indeed attenuate the gravest effects of the 
Social Question. Yet it was equally a Donosian theme that at any given time, 
government could only reflect the health of the underlying society, that fed its executive 
ranks, lent its consent—even if only tacitly—and abided (or not) by its laws. 
Governments could not overhaul society, just as an effect could not precede its cause.  
 It is clear in Donoso however, that for social reforms to be effective, these had 
to be inspired by the principles of religion, regardless of where they were launched from 
in society. In Donoso’s context, that pointed to the Roman Catholic Church, comprising 
its hierarchy and its lay members. In 1849, Donoso wrote to the French theologian 
Monsignor Jean-Joseph Gaume, 
I never had faith or confidence in the political action of good Catholics. All their 
efforts directed to reforming society by means of assemblies and Governments 
will be perpetually useless. Societies are not what they are because of being 
constituted...by Governments and assemblies...on the contrary, assemblies and 
Governments are what they are because the society they rule is what it is. It 
would be, therefore, necessary to invert the process, beginning by reforming 
society, and later, making use of the already reformed society, reform its 
institutions.48 
 
47 Pondering Donoso’s passage cited on Christ at Pilate’s court, Valverde notes “how profoundly 
religious sentiment, the enthusiasm for the person of Jesus Christ, and the conviction that in his doctrine 
the decisive solutions to humanity’s great problems were to be found had penetrated the heart of 
Donoso.” Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 507. 
48 Donoso Cortés, Juan. Carta a monseñor Gaume, 345. 
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On this occasion, Donoso’s hopes for a response to the Social Question are 
deposited with the action of Catholics qua Catholics, and outside the political process.  
Social reform through politics is possible, but it is a slow development that starts with 
the moral reform of society at its base. At any rate, Donoso’s tendency in this particular 
epistle is to prime the spirit of Catholicism’s social teachings against their political 
institutionalization.  
The same theme of the underlying social conditions as the horizon of 
government, and the primacy of Christianity over both society and government appears 
in the Curso de la historia de la civilización de España, 
Only Christianity can recognize inequality among men without injustice, 
because it offers them equality in heaven; only it can advise resignation to the 
poor and humble, because every for every human resignation there is a divine 
reward; only it can keep the impetuousness of desire, because for every repressed 
desire it has immense retributions. Antiquity had the vain intent of reforming 
individuals by reforming societies; Christianity taking the better path, has 
reformed society reforming man beforehand.49 
With respect to Donoso’s practical prescriptions to the Social Question then, the 
path to reform was, at the least, not the exclusive jurisdiction of government. Donoso 
looked to non-state solutions, drawing on the Christian virtue of caritas. While he 
recognized that relative poverty was a given in any society, he moralized about the 
sources of the particularly crude inequality of his time, derived from a “wealth 
accumulated by a gigantic egotism.” Donoso warned that if the “governors of nations 
do not solve the problem, socialism will come to resolve it.”50 The sincerity of Donoso’s 
social Catholicism convinced Marxist commentators. The playwright Juan Mayorga, 
from the perspective of class analysis, delivers Donoso from accusations of being an 
“organic class intellectual.”51 
 
49 Donoso Cortés, Juan. Curso de historia de la civilización de España, 24-25. 
50 Donoso Cortés, Carta a María Cristina, 726. Donoso is writing to Maria Christina of the Two Sicilies, 
queen consort and later regent of Spain, to whom he was an advisor at home and abroad while in exile, 
before going on to serve her daughter the future Queen Isabella II. 
51 “Associating Donoso’s thought to the interests of the new propertied classes helps to understand his 
evolution as well as his vacillations. But to reduce Donoso to the role of organic intellectual of a class 
to which oligarchic liberalism, first, and the sacralization of power, later, were functional, would be to 
falsify him. To the last Donoso, Catholicism is a complete civilization. ‘Secularization’ means not only 
the defeat of obedience, but also of charity. It is true that Catholicism sanctifies authority, but it is also 
incompatible with despotism, as it made governors ‘ministers of God and servants of the peoples’. 
‘When man became the son of God, he ceased to be the slave of man’: this idea is central to the Donoso 
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All the while, Donoso insisted on the importance of framing the problem of 
material inequality in spiritual terms. “What is socialism if not an economic sect?” 
asked Donoso.52 At the end of the day, the real threat to social disintegration was not so 
much poverty but nihilism. Donoso asserted the primacy of the spiritual over both the 
political and economic.53 
Nonetheless, on a different occasion, writing to Maria Christina, Donoso 
demanded that “the spirit and principles of Catholicism be restored to our political and 
economic legislation.”54 At this point, Donoso seemed to be more open to specifically 
Catholic political action from within the institutions. The extent to which the Christian 
virtue of charity might be legitimately and effectively compelled by legislation therefore 
remains unclear.  
What is beyond doubt is that for Donoso, without the right spirit, legislation was 
impotent on its own. The Social Question did not hinge on rational institutional design, 
a specific ministry or faction in parliament, technology, or the providential rise of a 
great general or statesman. “It is not intrigues, but principles, which have the divine 
virtue of saving sick nations,” he would go on to state.55 Principles are the true 
constitution of nations, and their spirit ought to command particular institutions. 
Religious truth is the foundation upon which policy must be built. 
 
who affirms a Catholic ideal of justice. Herein the distance with which he speaks of the bourgeois 
classes that have forsaken the Christian virtue of charity, solution to the problem of wealth distribution.” 
Mayorga, El Estado de excepción como milagro: de Donoso a Benjamin, 289; Donoso was 
paternalistically inclined to the popular elements in society, and often favored them over his own class, 
the bourgeoisie. He considered the latter irremediably skeptical and impotent philosophically, and inept 
politically. But what to make of the masses that had fallen prey of demagoguery and the revolutionary 
schemes of the socialists? Surveying XIX century European social Catholicism, Menczer wrote “Not 
that either Veuillot or Barbey d’Aurevilly, any more than Bloy or Peguy after them, would ever have 
been hostile to the ‘masses,’ or insensitive to the suffering of the poor. There are plenty of signs to the 
contrary. Nobody in the XIX century exalted the ideal of simplicity, or the virtue of humble work, 
higher than did Louis Veuillot in Les Libres-Penseurs; nobody imposed on himself the duty of active 
service in the cause of the poor more rigorously than Veuillot’s master, Donoso Cortes.” Menczer, 
Catholic Political Thought, 50. 
52 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre Europa, 454.  
53 For Carl Schmitt, every century, starting with the XVI, corresponded to a historical stage of the 
European spirit. Thus, the XVI was the century of theology; the XVII, of metaphysics; the XVIII of 
ethical humanism; and the XIX, the century of Donoso, of economics. The Social Question that defined 
Donoso’ time was materialist-economic, as was the dominant worldview. Thus, the spiritual-religious 
solutions he proposed could only be regarded as underwhelming when compared to the incipient 
materialist Gospel of socialism. 
54 Donoso Cortés, Carta a María Cristina, 726. 
55 Donoso Cortés, Carta a María Cristina, 729. 
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The Push of Ministry and the Pull of Asceticism 
By now, the reader will have noticed a mounting tension between the centrality 
of religion in Donoso and his staunch commitment to government action. The potential 
contradiction led Kennedy to put forth the following “paradox,” 
There is another [paradox] in the form of an unresolved conflict, between 
Donoso the man of thought and the man of action, over the effectiveness of 
government in society. The man of thought, especially after 1848, was 
pessimistic over—he even despaired of—the future of European society. Society 
was ill, perhaps mortally so. If a remedy existed it was not to be found in the 
economic and social palliatives that were the best that government could offer. 
Instead, the specific lay in the forces of religion which would have to be 
administered to each and every member of society. This, he was certain, would 
cure the disease, but Donoso was doubtful that his prescription would be 
accepted. And at any rate the cure lay far beyond the province of government. 
But the man of action refused to be consistent: he continued to be the energetic 
servant of government and to act as though the institutions government were still 
of basic importance.56 
Kennedy alleged there was an unsolvable incongruence between Donoso’s belief 
in the monopoly of religious solutions over the Social Question, and his career in public 
service. Setting ethical questions aside, Kennedy drew a line between Donoso the “man 
of thought” and “the man of action”—exactly what MacIntyre protests. Focusing on 
“the man of action,” Kennedy explained Donoso as a “servant of the state” whose 
fundamental political instinct was to procure “workable solutions” that propped-up the 
status quo, regardless of their content. What concerned Kennedy, and in his view should 
concern those seeking to grasp Donoso, was exclusively Donoso’s “long record of 
service to the Crown and to the government.”57 
If our account of Donoso’s limited but energetic statecraft is convincing, then 
Kennedy’s paradox will undo itself throughout our investigation. For now, we may 
begin by affirming, pace Kennedy, that we know for a fact how deeply Donoso himself 
cared about consistency between his convictions and his political action. Kennedy 
seemed to be unaware that Donoso himself meditated along the lines of his “paradox” 
up until his final days in Paris.  
 
56 Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State”, 523. 
57 Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State”, 523. 
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Nonetheless, Kennedy did pose a meaningful question. The primitive issue of 
whether to partake in or fully resign from politics that Kennedy hinted at is by no means 
trivial. The anarchist current within the Christian tradition, for example, views 
mainstream political action wholly untenable from a moral perspective. As any 
Christian with worldly political sensibilities but otherworldly ends, Donoso pondered 
the rightful place of politics in this world. 
Kennedy’s paradox therefore runs deeper than the superficial problems of 
ideological coherence or political affiliation posited by the folk theory, putatively 
resolved by Donoso’s conversion. The potential contradiction is greater. Donoso’s crisis 
hinged on the question of the legitimacy of his political vocation outright, from a 
Christian viewpoint, given the new paradigm of statecraft. 
McIntyre, in turn, laid out the problem of Christian politics in modernity by 
drawing a parallel to the decline of the Roman empire. In the last page of After Virtue, 
he writes, 
A crucial turning point in [Roman] history occurred when men and women of 
good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the imperium. What they set 
themselves to achieve instead—often not recognizing fully what they were 
doing—was the construction of new forms of community within which the moral 
life could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the 
coming ages of barbarism and darkness.58 
How did Donoso position himself vis-à-vis the question of upholding or 
sidestepping existing political structures? Donoso carried out his life of high politics 
within the system. His overall trajectory implies an affirmative answer to the question 
of modern Christian politics. Donoso’s lifelong “shoring up” of the Spanish Monarchy 
(even after recognizing its power had been de facto abolished by the age), and his 
definitive refusal to abandon his diplomatic mission to Paris embodied this disposition.  
But Donoso’s decision to remain involved in politics was not merely instinctual, 
as Kennedy suggests. It followed from a particular rationale for statecraft. Together 




58 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 263. 
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II. The Foundational and Transcendent Limits of 
Statecraft 
The Divinity of Authority 
The most salient source of Donoso’s rationale for statecraft is found in his theory 
of authority. Temporal authority must be upheld insofar as it participates analogically 
in divine authority.  
In a series of 1847 newspaper articles on the incipient Papacy of Pius IX, Donoso 
put forth that “if in Catholic societies the peoples obey supreme authority, obeying it, 
they are only obeying God, that has willed that that authority represents him in the State, 
and that it be a holy and august thing. Omnis potestas a Deo.”59 Donoso, embracing the 
Pauline teaching, believed that only the gap between God and man could sustain the 
notion of rule and obedience. Similarly, a ruler could only exercise authority over 
another man in representation of God. 
Donoso’s belief in the Divine (as opposed to mundane) origin of authority is the 
deepest continuity in Donoso’s political thought. This element was present in Donoso 
even before he assumed a markedly Catholic rhetoric. In 1843, Donoso argued, “I do 
not believe in the divine right of kings, but I believe that in supreme majesty, considered 
in abstract, there is something divine, and I believe that the person who exercises it, be 
it a king, president, emperor or consul, is sacred.”60  
Donoso had developed his theory of authority even earlier, in the Lecciones de 
Derecho Político, a series of lectures in political and legal philosophy delivered 
throughout 1836-1837. Valverde wrote of the Lecciones that, 
to explain contingent reason [Donoso] appeals to necessary and absolute reason. 
Guided by his logic, he concludes by basing human authority—which he calls 
authority of fact—in divine authority—only authority of right (autoridad de 
derecho)—. Thus he forms a metaphysical construction that—transformed only 
accidentally, but substantially identical—will be that which will always uphold 
his political thought; there is an absolute divine order, of which human orders 
 
59 Donoso Cortés, Pío IX, 202-203. 
60 Donoso Cortés, Sobre la mayoría de edad de doña Isabel II, 10. 
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are participation of; that is why they are sacred and inviolable and that is why 
they ought to be respected by human freedoms.61  
Donoso’s enduring commitment to authority flowed from the belief in a personal 
God. His theory of authority retained the same analogical structure in the articles on 
Pius IX, published a decade later. But it took on a more specifically Catholic character, 
...before revealing to man the unity of the human race, that is, democracy, God 
revealed his own unity, that is, monarchy; together these two revelations are the 
constitutive elements of the notions of obedience and command, of freedom and 
order, of force and limit, of movement and the rule. If the right to rule and the 
obligation to obey can not exist in the human race, because all men are equal and 
brethren, that right can be conceived in the Creator without falling into the 
absurd, and that obligation can be conceived in the creature without falling into 
the delirious, insofar as between the creature and the Creator there can be no 
equality nor fraternity possible...in Catholic societies man always obeys God and 
never obeys man. If in Catholic societies the son obeys the father, this consists 
only in that God has willed that the father represent him in the family, and that 
he has made paternity something venerable and holy. If in Catholic societies the 
people obey supreme authority obeying it, it only obeys God, that has willed that 
authority to represent him in the State and for it to be something holy and August. 
Omni potestas a Deo.62 
Eventually, Donoso’ persistent use of analogy linked smoothly to a more refined 
Catholic metaphysics. By the time of the Ensayo, Donoso painted a picture of the 
Trinity and its analogical actualizations throughout Creation, 
The same God, that is author and governor of political society, is author and 
governor of domestic society. In the hiddenmost, highest, most serene and most 
luminous of the heavens, resides a Tabernacle inaccessible even to the choirs of 
angels: in that inaccessible Tabernacle the prodigy of prodigies and mystery of 
mysteries is perpetually being worked. There is the Catholic God, one and 
triune...There unity, dilating itself, eternally engeders variety; and variety, 
condensing itself, is resolved unto unity eternally…[In God’s essence] are, in a 
way indescribable and incomprehensible, the laws of creation and the exemplars 
of all things. Everything has been made in its image; that is why creation is one 
and various. The word universo means unity and variety together in one.63  
 
Donoso’s fundamental law of unity and variety reflects an essentially creative and 
dynamic God. His triune essence contains, unfathomably, the providential ebbs and 
 
61 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 387. 
62 Donoso Cortés, Pío IX, 202. 
63 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 507. 
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flows of history, whereby humankind tends to unity and fragmentation, successively.64  
As if it were the very pulse of history, the law constitutes the dialectical movement of 
Donoso’s whole philosophy.65 Unity and variety are “the law of nations, of the human 
race and History.”66  
 Amongst other things, the law determines how authority is configured into 
political power on Earth. Donoso believed that political order was organized 
analogically with respect to God, insofar as there was unity in the source of authority, 
and variety in its concrete manifestations. He understood institutions (which he calls 
hierarchies or jerarquías in Spanish) as conforming to a hierarchy of hierarchies. This 
cosmic hierarchy was diverse but also unique in its lifeblood, namely, Divine authority 
ultimately nested in God. 
Thus, Donoso’s Universe was Rome-centric but heterogeneous. It took concrete 
form in his ideal of a loose confederation of Christian princes, indirectly subordinated 
to Rome. 
From the variety of municipalities national unity is formed, that at the same time 
is symbolized in a throne and personified in a king. Above all these magnificent 
associations is that of all the catholic nations with their Christian princes, 
fraternally grouped in the bosom of the Church. This very perfect and supreme 
association is unity in its head and variety in its members: it is variety in the 
faithful scattered in the world, and unity in the holy chair that gleams in 
Rome...This eminent chair is the center of humanity, represented, insofar as it is 
diverse, by the general councils, insofar as it is one, by who is on earth the 
common Father of the faithful and the Vicar of Jesus Christ.67 
 
64 An appraisal of the law can be found in Valverde’s introduction to the Obras completas, 104-107. 
65 The first reference to the dialectic we have encountered dates from 1834 “humanity is always identical 
to itself in the midst of the diversity of its revolutions.” Donoso Cortés, Consideraciones sobre la 
diplomacia, 262. 
66 Donoso Cortés, Estado de las relaciones diplomáticas entre Francia y España, 523. 
67 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 523; Donoso’s vision is 
consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church, at least up until the 1961 encyclical Mater et 
Magistra, under the pontificate of John XXIII. In a section under the title Unity, not uniformity, the 
Pontiff wrote “The Church of Jesus Christ...is the repository of His wisdom; she is certainly too wise to 
discourage or belittle those peculiarities and differences which mark out one nation from another. It is 
quite legitimate for nations to treat those differences as a sacred inheritance and guard them at all costs. 
The Church aims at unity, a unity determined and kept alive by that supernatural love which should be 
actuating everybody; she does not aim at a uniformity which would only be external in its effects and 
would cramp the natural tendencies of the nations concerned. Every nation has its own genius, its own 
qualities, springing from the hidden roots of its being. The wise development, the encouragement within 
limits, of that genius, those qualities, does no harm; and if a nation cares to take precautions, to lay 
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As Valverde pointed out, in Donoso the answer given to the metaphysical question 
about the origin of authority determined the social and political context.68 Donoso’s 
answer was that authority flowed top-down from God. It is no surprise, therefore, that 
Donoso censured the bottom-up, voluntarist social-contractarianism of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. For Rousseau and his followers, says Donoso, “free man is the center of 
creation; he is not born for society, society has been formed for him...if his will is his 
rule, there is no rule outside of him, if there is no rule outside of him, there is no God, 
if there isn’t, man is God”.69 
If the principle of authority is the foundation of any lasting social order, its 
absence implies social breakdown and anarchy. This, according to Donoso, was 
precisely Europe’s political problem. In the 1850 Discurso sobre Europa, the second in 
the great trilogy of speeches, Donoso affirmed, 
...economic reforms are no essential remedy for this evil; the fall of a government 
and its replacement by another government is no remedy. The fundamental error 
in this matter consists in believing that the evils of Europe are born of 
governments. I will not deny the influence of government over the governed. 
How could I deny it? Who has ever denied it? But evil is much more profound, 
evil is much more grave. Evil is not in governments, evil is in the governed; evil 
is in that the governed have come to be ungovernable...the true cause of the deep 
and profound evil that afflicts Europe is in the fact that the idea of divine 
authority and human authority has disappeared. That is the evil that afflicts 
Europe, the evil that afflicts society, the evil that afflicts the world; and that is 
why, gentlemen, the people are ungovernable.70 
Because Europe had denied the principle of divine authority, it had rejected the 
corollary of temporal authority, and had become ungovernable.  
For Donoso, both the source and the limits of political power were traditionally 
informed by Divine authority and Christian ethics. The imprint of political modernity 
was that power, newly autonomous from authority, recognized no limits beyond its own 
internal logic. Hence the massive potential for the destruction of Creation in the vast 
accumulation of power, centralized in the high-modernist state, unchecked by a 
 
down rules, for that end, it has the Church’s approval. She is mother enough to befriend such projects 
with her prayers.” John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, sec. 181. 
68 Valverde, introduction to the Obras completas, 123.  
69 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 333. Characteristically, Donoso is occupied with 
the theological premises of political philosophies, in this case of Rousseau’s idea of Man. 
70 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre Europa, 457. 
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transcendent notion of authority, soon to be at the disposal of the power-hungry 
ideologues behind the revolutions of 1848.  
The problem of the limitation of power as Donoso experienced it will occupy us 
directly later on. At this point, as we conclude our discussion of Donosian authority, it 
is illustrative to draw on the ancient distinction between auctoritas, or socially 
recognized knowledge, and potestas, or socially recognized power. It is echoed by 
Negro Pavón as so, “auctoritas and potestas, authority and power, are two juridical 
concepts discovered by the Romans that are decisive in political thought. The legitimacy 
of power depends on auctoritas. But the revolution substituted legitimacy, of 
transcendent foundation, with legality, of immanent foundation.”71  
Government as Resistance 
Donoso conceptualized government as the executive arm of authority. 
Government was society in action, organized as a self-defensive force, substantiated by 
divine authority, with the unity of the organic social order as its end.  
Donoso deduced this theory of government from very concrete anthropological 
premises in the Lecciones de Derecho Político. Governments, Donoso tells us, “are not 
scholastic entities, but historical realities; that is why they should not be considered in 
themselves, but in their relation to society.”72 With his characteristic anthropological 
focus, and his eyes set on the society at its base, he found the root of all social conflict 
in the constitutive dualism of human beings: the tension between intelligence and will.73 
For Donoso intellects were attractive of each other, harmonious and expansive. Where 
there were intelligent beings, there were spontaneous, orderly and reciprocal 
relationships, based on mutual interdependence. It was the will, rather, that was 
problematic. If intelligence was social and centripetal, the will was antisocial and 
centrifugal. A dependent will was a contradiction in terms.74 Herein lay the fundamental 
social problem for Donoso: the contradiction of individual wills, as these contradictions 
spilled over from the personal to the social sphere.  
 
71 Negro Pavón, Historia de las Formas del Estado, 104. 
72 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 329. 
73 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 332. 
74 Díez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario, 500. 
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If human beings were solely intelligent, government would be redundant, given 
the associative tendency of the intellect. Yet our volitional nature necessitated 
government. In Donoso’s view, the unconstrained will would destroy any society 
brought forth by intelligence, because the will by its nature was a “dissolving principle 
of all associations.” Thus, Donoso aimed to preserve the integrity of society without 
mutilating human freedom.  
Accordingly, society had the right to absorb that part of human individuality that 
was necessary for its existence, and human individuality had the right to retain all the 
part of freedom in excess of what society needed to exist. Thus, government was the 
organized action of society to resist invasions of the will.75 “Government,” argued 
Donoso, “does not govern but by action because...for government to act is to be, and it 
does not act but by resisting the invading principle; consequently, for the government 
to act is to resist. If government is action, and that action is resistance, Government is 
resistance as well.”76 Government in Donoso’s mind reined in a variety of forces—
individualist, minoritarian, majoritarian or outright anarchical, depending on the 
particular political circumstance. But it was “always and everywhere in history 
resisting.”77 Effective resistance conserved the social fabric, reconciling of freedom and 
order. 
For Donoso Governments too could be invasive, and unjustly harm one of the 
three ontological categories prevalent in the Lecciones: intelligence, freedom (the will) 
and society.78 Political order, in this case, degenerated into despotism.  The preservation 
of these categories was the “rule that traces a limit [Power] can’t trespass.”79 Broadly 
speaking, Donoso was an unoriginal proponent of ordered liberty.  
The ordering principle of the Lecciones—that of the sovereignty of 
intelligence—was imported from the French doctrinaire liberal school.80 Doctrinaire 
 
75 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 329. 
76 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 333. 
77 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 333. 
78 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 334. 
79 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 334. 
80 Donoso was fashionably inclined to French ideas. He read the doctrinaire liberals across the Pyrenees: 
Constant, Cousin, Royer-Collard, and above all Guizot, earning Donoso the nickname Guizotín. 
Politically, their common denominator was the search for equilibrium—the juste milieu—between 
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liberalism, amongst other things, offered a response to the theoretical problem of 
sovereignty and its rightful possessor. Donoso followed the doctrinaires, espousing the 
juste milieu between two extremes that he described as equally “reactionary” and 
voluntarist, namely, the divine right of kings and popular sovereignty.81  
Practically speaking, the sovereignty of intelligence is the sovereignty of the 
bourgeoisie or “legitimate aristocracy,” of which Donoso was surely a part.82 Royer-
Collard’s maxim, whereby the good choose the best, is echoed by Donoso in La Ley 
Electoral (1835) “the best have the right to rule, and since the law doesn’t know them, 
she commissions so that the good are designated; the electors, in choosing, do no more 
than pronounce a name that the law seeks but does not know.”83 
Just as intelligence or reason can be located within man as a part of his dualism, 
intelligence can be located in the social organism. The bourgeoisie is its repository. The 
rising middle classes are the mediator between contingent and absolute reason, the latter 
traced up to the divine regions where ultimate authority resides. A capable government 
is necessarily an intelligent government. Only intelligence has the faculty of “foreseeing 
obstacles and calculating resistances.”84  
The Place of Ideology in the Statecraft of Donoso Cortés 
Curiously, Donoso has been associated with mutually exclusive ideologies by 
historiography. He has been characterized as an intellectual appendix to both doctrinaire 
liberals and to traditionalists. More specifically, to the doctrinaires Constant, Cousin, 
Royer-Collard and especially Guizot, and to the traditionalists de Maistre, Bonald, and 
Lamennais. Both characterizations are consistent with the folk theory, according to 
which Donoso fully embraced both ideologies, evolving in his thinking from one 
position to the other. Instead, a reading of constantes must show that Donoso’s 
 
withering absolute monarchy and the burgeoning demands of popular sovereignty. Donoso embraced 
their philosophical eclecticism and political moderation. 
81 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 370. The title of the fifth lecture is “The identity 
between two reactionary principles: popular sovereignty and the right of kings” for a title.  
82 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 311. 
83 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 308. 
84 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 383. 
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readjustments in theory and practice respond to a rationale for statecraft of a higher 
magnitude.  
In our analysis based on continuity, Donoso never fully embraced either 
Francophone group, but rather selected elements from both schools circumstantially, 
insofar as they were effective for upholding the principle of divine authority. To this 
end, we have gathered evidence, not so much of the affinities that Donoso holds with 
doctrinaires and traditionalists, abundantly recorded in Donosian literature, but of the 
subtle differences he held with both schools, during the periods in which he orbited 
them.85 
The Doctrinaire Liberals 
Donoso diverged slightly but crucially from the doctrinaire liberals in the pages 
of the Lecciones. Fernández-Carvajal maintained that there was a close affinity between 
intelligence and force that was absent in the doctrinaires. Donoso’s Hispanic variation 
on the sovereignty of intelligence was not so much about institutional design as it was 
about strength capable of upholding authority. Férnandez-Carvajal noted that 
intelligence in Donoso had a “demiurgic character with respect to the foundation of 
society and power.” Non est potestas nisi a intelligentia was Fernández-Carvajal’s play 
on words.86 Similarly, Arranz Notario affirms that “The essential function of Donosian 
sovereignty of intelligence was repressive.”87  
Of the Roman Republic, Donoso himself said, “The Romans [were victorious] 
over all peoples because they were the most intelligent of all peoples. Rome subjugated 
the world because she was the intelligence of the world. Her domination has the stamp 
of legitimacy, because I see the stamp of legitimate power in all intelligent power.”88 
Thus, the Roman Republic struck Donoso as one of the successive incarnations of 
intelligence in history. In this respect, Gallego García has observed that Donoso 
 
85 Bartyzel, “Tres encarnaciones de Donoso Cortés: constitucionalista-decisionista- providencialista,” 
is an example of a widely disseminated study, in which Donoso in his “constitutionalist incarnation” is 
homologous to the doctrinaire liberals. 
86 Fernández-Carvajal, “Las constantes de Donoso Cortés,” 81. 
87 Arranz Notario, “El pensamiento de Juan Donoso Cortés": ‘la libertad no es otra cosa que la facultad 
de obedecer,’” 66. 
88 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 407. 
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assumed human reason could only accord with Divine reason. Hence, Donoso did not 
consider the problem of contradictions between contingent and absolute reason.89 
Likewise, Arranz Notario notes a mounting tension between the limited intelligence of 
the doctrinaires “and the omniscient reason that [Donoso] identified with God” in the 
final lectures of the Lecciones.90  
The doctrinaire liberals were more reserved about the coincidence of intelligence 
and power at the head of society. Consequently, they were more concerned with the 
design of institutions for the rational organization and limitation of power. Guizot 
warned against “the incarnation of sovereignty in a group or in a man,” from which his 
support of the doctrine of separation of powers followed.91 Guizot also favored the 
cycling of elites via elections, and “publicity,” or “the call to the search of truth and 
justice to all men who possess rights in collaboration with those who exercise powers.”92 
Division of powers, elite cycling and publicity were the three pillars of Guizot’s 
representative government.  
Alternatively, government in Donoso was chiefly the executive arm of the social 
organism in defensive mode, and not a procedure to channel the social stock of 
intelligence at any given time. While the imperative of social conservation in Donoso 
is most famously captured in the dictum from the Discurso sobre la dictadura that “laws 
have been made for societies, and not societies for laws,” it is in fact present more than 
a decade earlier in the Lecciones.93 As we have noted, the standard of a just government 
in the Lecciones was the conservation of  “all existences,” including society itself.94 
Thus, the Lecciones contain a theoretical justification of the institution of dictatorship 
ordered to this principle. During “cataclysmic” times, in whom shall sovereignty reside, 
asked Donoso? “In the strong man, gentlemen; in the strong and intelligent man that 
Constitutions cannot anticipate...he does not belong to the domain of written laws, nor 
to the domain of philosophical theories; it is a protest against those laws and these 
 
89 Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 18. 
90 Arranz Notario, “El pensamiento de Juan Donoso Cortés”, 70.  
91 Fernández-Carvajal, “Las constantes de Donoso Cortés,” 80.  
92 Fernández-Carvajal, “Las constantes de Donoso Cortés,” 81. 
93 To which Valverde comments in a footnote to his Obras Completas “this is the base and starting point 
of the whole of Donoso’s mature political thought: the value of civil society as absolute.” Donoso 
Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 306. 
94 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 334. 
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theories.”95 In kind, Donoso will conclude the last of the Lecciones by proclaiming that 
“only truth is eternal; only the memory of the strongman that knows how to defend it 
amidst ruins is eternal.”96 
The Traditionalists 
Folk-theorists believe that by and large Donoso adopts traditionalism as a 
political philosophy after his “conversion.” According to this narrative, the space left 
by the doctrinaire liberals after his break with them is filled by the traditionalists de 
Maistre, De Bonald and especially Lamennais. Donoso’s political thought is again 
represented as a footnote. This was the persuasion of Spanish pens such as Menéndez 
Pelayo and Enrique Tierno Galván, to name a few.97 Instead, we find that Donoso’s 
association with traditionalism is best understood as downstream from the principle of 
authority that animates Donoso’s statecraft in whole. 
In his introduction to the Obras Completas, Valverde recognized that “at first 
sight, the influences [of the traditionalists] are notable, to the extent that Donoso has 
simply been classified amongst the traditionalists, with no other influence but that of de 
Bonald or de Maistre, when there are others and much more important.”98  
Valverde interpreted Donoso’s traditionalism as instrumental: “pressed by the 
urgency of avoiding evils and by the activity of his political and diplomatic life, he 
never stopped to reflect profoundly on traditionalism, and accepted it as he found it in 
the French.”99 The basic theory of traditionalism—that reason is incapable of reaching 
the truth on its own, and that all truth has its origin in revelation, later conveyed by 
tradition to humanity—was politically convenient for Donoso, and intellectually useful 
to combat liberal rationalism. By no means did Valverde, a Jesuit himself, justify 
Donoso. By taking the traditionalists at face value, Donoso incurred in “inadmissible” 
extremes in his denigration of human reason, thus departing from the orthodox Catholic 
understanding of man and his rational capacities.  
 
95 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 390. 
96 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 445. 
97 Valverde, introduction to Obras completas de Juan Donoso Cortés, 88-92. Valverde’s introduction 
considers the extent of Donoso’s philosophical traditionalism.  
98 Valverde, introduction to Obras completas de Juan Donoso Cortés, 88.  
99 Valverde, introduction to Obras completas de Juan Donoso Cortés, 89-90. 
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All things considered, Valverde attenuated the role of traditionalist theory of 
knowledge in Donoso. After sampling Donoso’s views on human reason found 
elsewhere, he concluded that the core of Donoso’s social and political thought would 
be left intact had Donoso adopted an Aristotelian conception of reason throughout.  
Sevilla Andrés observed that, in spite of the obvious importance of theology for 
Donoso, he “is not a theologizing author, rather he uses dogmas without discussing 
them and dedicates his efforts to build, on top of the truths of Catholicism, a social and 
political theory in accordance with them...to extract the last socio-political consequence 
of our faith.”100  
Donoso as a Situational Conservative 
Donoso’s imposing oratory, plenty with absolute affirmations and negations, is 
often quoted by Catholic traditionalists. Yet his rhetorical style coexisted with a lesser 
known but equally prolific moderate political praxis. Donosian historiography is overly 
idealistic in this sense. Donoso’s strategy consisted of grasping his own situation amid 
actually existing political forces and building broad-based counterrevolutionary 
coalitions. His tactic was co-optation. 
Donoso employed political ideologies to this end. He was aware, perhaps more 
than a pure political philosopher could ever be, that upholding the principle of authority 
required a tactical ideological attunement to the changing political circumstances. 
Fernández-Carvajal describes the political landscape Donoso faced as so, 
The Spanish obsession of the moment is to reach a point of political equilibrium, 
and to this are opposed during Donoso’s life, as in successive extremes, 
absolutism, progressivism and socialist and democratic revolutionism. ‘He is an 
ardent liberal, first, because liberalism is the refuge against the excess of pure 
monarchy; immediately after he is a doctrinaire, because the sovereignty of 
reason protects him against the saturnals of demagoguery; he plunges, finally, 
into monarchical reaction because he judges authority to be vilified and abated, 
 
100 Sevilla Andrés provides the following example of this type of Donosian construction: “Where his 
fidelity to Dogma and his desire to extract ultimate consequences for political order is clearest is in his 




and because he understands that only being strong and legitimate does 
[monarchy] save societies from sways and disorders.’101 
Donoso acted at a time when opposite forces pulled away from the authority of 
government, in contrary directions. Preserving the principle of authority required 
adopting different—often contradictory—ideological positions, in order to balance out 
the destructive forces threatening Spanish society.  
Donoso’s statecraft could be described by what Samuel Huntington termed 
“situational conservatism.”102 For Huntington, conservatism was contingent upon 
actually existing institutions and relations amongst groups. Huntington contrasted 
conservatism, an “institutional ideology,” from what he called “ideational ideologies.” 
Conservatism is “relevant in a particular type of historical situation...it does not ask 
ultimate questions and hence does not give final answers. But it does remind men of the 
institutional prerequisites of social order. And when these prerequisites are threatened, 
conservatism is not only appropriate, it is essential.” Thus, according to Huntington, 
conservatism is not an “autonomous” ideology, but a praxis developed to meet a 
historical need. 
Arguably then, Donoso was a situational conservative. Huntington stated that 
“no political philosopher has ever described a conservative utopia...in any society, there 
may be institutions to be conserved, but there are never conservative institutions.”103 
Donoso always looked to the monarchy. The throne was the concrete institution that 
alone could authoritatively preserve social peace by integrating several factions in 
Spain. It was the axis for Donoso’s big tent counterrevolutionary coalition.  
Thus, he faithfully served María Christina during her regency, and went on to 
serve her daughter Queen Isabella II, as private secretary and ambassador. In an 1844 
parliamentary speech, Donoso defended that, 
Spain, gentlemen, has always been a Monarchy; that Monarchy, in the 
prolongation of time, has been a religious Monarchy; that Monarchy, in the 
prolongation of the centuries, has been a democratic Monarchy. Monarchy! See 
here political truth for us. Catholicism! See here, for all, but for us especially, 
 
101 Fernández-Carvajal, “Las constantes de Donoso Cortés,” 77. Here, Fernández-Carvajal is quoting 
the work of Donoso’s collaborator, J. Francisco Pacheco. 
102 Huntington, “Conservatism as an ideology,” 473. 
103 Huntington, “Conservatism as an ideology,” 458. 
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religious truth. Democracy! Here lies social truth for us. Catholicism, Monarchy, 
democracy, see here the Spanish truth in full.104 
Donoso fought to shore up monarchy as an institution. All the while, answers to 
ultimate questions remained in the purview and custody of the Church and her dogmas. 
Preserving social order through the monarchy ensured that the Church would maintain 
its freedom and this, as we will argue, was the end to which all of Donoso’s statecraft 
was oriented to. 
If we turn to Donoso’s political biography, we will see that the spirit of 
“situational conservatism” surfaced at some other turning points. Thus, Donoso 
accepted the Spanish constitution of 1837, drafted by the progressives in power, insofar 
as it followed “moderate principles” (although he rejected the principle of national 
sovereignty, that was included in the preamble, and not in the body of the text). 
Considering this text, with a clear sense of the politically viable, Donoso added that 
“perfection in politics is almost impossible to obtain, and if the 1837 Constitution is not 
perfect, if it could be so some more, according to our ideas, not because of this we will 
not adopt it with sincerity.”105 
By 1838, in the Polémica con el doctor Rossi, Donoso gathered that the 
eclecticism of the doctrinaire liberals no longer sufficed to uphold the principle of 
authority. If doctrinaire concepts had been suitable in the aftermath of the 1830 
revolution and instrumental to the institution of the July Monarchy, France now needed 
“philosophical, political and social dogma to preside over the consummation of its 
glorious destinies and illuminate its race.”106 “Society no longer needs analytic 
eclecticism useful to discover error, but synthetic dogmatism to discover new truths,” 
added Donoso.107 France “seeks what eclectic philosophy cannot provide: a dogma.”108 
In this respect, the doctrinaires had become “doctors of an impotent science.”109 The 
 
104 Donoso Cortés, Discurso pronunciado en el congreso a propósito de una enmienda al proyecto de 
constitución, 88; Donoso, clarified, de rigueur, that when he spoke of a democratic Monarchy, was not 
referring  to the “Monarchy of the mob” but to that Monarchy in which “the common interests prevail 
over the privileged interests, the general interests over the aristocratic interests.” Donoso Cortés, 
Discurso pronunciado en el congreso a propósito de una enmienda al proyecto de constitución, 88. 
105 Garrido Muro, “‘Cómo organizar el caos’: Donoso Cortés en la política española,” 41. 
106 Donoso Cortés, Polémica con el Dr. Rossi, 497. 
107 Donoso Cortés, Polémica con el Dr. Rossi, 498. 
108 Donoso Cortés, Polémica con el Dr. Rossi, 499. 
109 Donoso Cortés, Polémica con el Dr. Rossi, 498. 
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bourgeois doctrinaires, from their new position in government, had begun to 
vacillate.110  
And yet the same doctrinaire principles that Donoso had considered exhausted 
for France were circumstantially useful to Spain. Indeed, he recovered them for the 1845 
constitutional reform. According to Suárez’s biography, Donoso acted as the Secretary 
of the Commission responsible for drafting the dictum.111 In a 1844 speech presenting 
the constitutional reform to parliament, the Discurso sobre el proyecto de Constitución, 
Donoso posited that “In Spain, to govern, it is necessary to unite in a single center all 
the constitutive elements of the Spanish nation. And what are these elements? Religion, 
Monarchy and Democracy; a party that is not at once monarchic, religious and 
democratic, cannot govern well.”112  
The doctrinaire juste milieu proved supremely useful and practicable given 
Spain’s specific balance of power. As Kennedy points out, 
“[Donoso] begged the various parties and factions of Spain to unite. The Carlists, 
he said, had been concerned only with religion; they had neglected the rest. The 
moderados (his own party), had supported liberty and the monarchy, but they 
had not been attentive to democracy; the liberals had supported the monarchy 
and democracy, but they had made the latter turbulent and revolutionary, they 
had made liberty suffer. He hoped that the reformed constitution might be the 
means of joining all these forces in the interest of the welfare of Spain.”113 
By co-optation, Donoso constructed a coalition to neutralize the latent Carlist 
challenge and the specter of civil war, while keeping the Partido Progresista at a 
distance.114 The constitutional reform effectively consolidated the liberal regime of 
 
110 In a later diplomatic dispatch, sent from Paris in 1851, Donoso would recall the bourgeois 
doctrinaires’ incapacity to govern vis-à-vis the ferment of the 1848 revolution. “Those classes, dominant 
today in Europe, are dispossessed of the two qualities that make Government possible: obedience and 
command. Not knowing how to command those who obey nor obeying those who command, they do 
nothing but agitate society and oblige it to seek refuge or a remedy in dictatorship or in revolutions. All 
the peoples dominated by those classes will perpetually oscillate between dictatorship, the remedy to 
anarchy, and anarchy, the remedy to dictatorship.” Donoso Cortés, Despachos desde París (1851-1853), 
832.  
111 Suárez, Vida y Obra de Juan Donoso Cortés, 545-552. 
112 Donoso Cortés, Discurso pronunciado en el congreso a propósito de una enmienda al proyecto de 
constitución, 91. 
113 Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State,” 540. 
114 The context of the constitutional reform is the aftermath of the First Carlist War (1833-1840). 
Sometimes referred to as the First Civil War in Spanish historiography, the war was ignited by the 
problem of the succession of Ferdinand VII. On one side were the supporters of Carlos María Isidro de 
Borbón or Don Carlos (Ferdinand’s brother): the Carlistas. On the other, those of his daughter, who 
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Queen Isabella II. The new text inaugurated the Decada Moderada, during which 
Donoso’s Partido Moderado gained hegemony for a decade.115 According to Díez del 
Corral, Donoso’s “ideological rigor and acute realist sense” would be embodied by 
Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, doctrinaire and chief architect of the Bourbon 
Restauración, who picked up Donoso’s constitutional framework in 1876.116 
The 1845 reform weaved the triumvirate of religion, monarchy and democracy 
together, defending and building on socially-rooted realities and institutions, rather than 
“ideating” radically new institutions, in the abstract. Statecraft, as ever, consisted in 
keeping the Spanish social organism together, even at the expense of ideological purity. 
This was the purpose and the standard to which Donoso’s subjected doctrinaire 
principles as he recovered them. In this way, appeasement and concession in the short 
run could be reconciled to the overarching interests of authority in the long run.   
While the spirit of Donoso’s pragmatism would survive him, he would abandon 
it as a viable political route for Spain following the upheavals of 1848 across the 
continent. By the time of the 1849 Discurso sobre la dictadura, the pressures of faction 
could no longer be conducted. The center did not hold. Only then, Donoso reluctantly 
supported Narváez’s commissary dictatorship. A year later, he would vote him down. 
The moderate regime Donoso had helped build was overthrown by the 1854 revolution 
or Vicalvarada, inaugurating the bienio progresista. 
 
would become Queen Isabella II. A peace treaty was signed in 1840, but the traditional forces backing 
Don Carlos remained latent. At the time of the outbreak of the war, Donoso had recently arrived in 
Madrid. He worked in favor of the liberal Isabeline cause. Soon, the liberals would split into progressive 
and moderate camps, Donoso joining the latter. 
115 Upon the arrival of the moderados to power in 1844, the Holy See, that had unilaterally broken off 
diplomatic relations with Spain after the clergy was obliged to swear-in the constitution of 1837, 
recognized Isabella II as the legitimate queen of Spain. 
116 Díez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario, 521; Díez del Corral concludes his chapter on Donoso 
with the following judgement “Donoso is not merely an idealist, elusive of concrete political realities. 
Beneath the rhetorical apparel and pure questions of principle there is a very real practical posture. The 
contest between socialist and Catholic phalanxes is not projected upon a vague posterity, it is specified 
in the immediate political moment, and decision is a weapon in the hand of flesh and bone personages. 
The theological apparatus does not only move in lofty regions, it works in favor of very singular 
politicians: one good day, Louis Napoleon turns out to be the instrument of Providence: ‘Let God’s 




The Carlist Question 
Donoso’s reservations towards legitimist Carlism, his affiliation with the Partido 
Moderado, and his service to a monarchy of liberal tendency often arise in scholarly as 
well as informal conversations. Wasn’t Carlism the only political home for a religious 
traditionalist? Juan Beneyto Pérez framed the problem in the following terms, “the two 
greatest personalities of counterrevolutionary ideological lineage, are two traditionalists 
that did not affiliate, however, to the corresponding political organization: Balmes and 
Donoso.”117  
During his mature political life, Donoso confronted the Second Carlist War 
(1846-1849), or Guerra de los ‘matiners.’ Compared to the destructive First Carlist 
War, the conflict was a low-intensity insurrection, regionally concentrated in Catalonia. 
By then, Donoso was deep into his project of national integration from the ranks of the 
Partido Moderado.118 In this iteration of dynastic conflict, the balance of power was so 
uneven, that anything but shoring up the Isabeline Monarchy would have been 
equivalent to undermining the principle of authority. 
Once again, Donoso’ situational conservatism was at play. But before addressing 
the political moment further, we must insist that this mode of operating in Donoso was 
not a pure form of realpolitik. Rather, it was derived from his theory of authority and 
government, which at the same time was laden with the normativity of the transcendent 
limit of statecraft. Recapitulating: government was divinely authorized, yet acted upon 
concrete anthropological realities, with the integrity of society as its object. Quite 
 
117 Beneyto Pérez, Historia de las doctrinas políticas, 450.  
118 In a meeting with Guizot in 1845, Donoso considered the possibility of a marriage between Isabella 
II and Carlos Luis de Borbón, Count of Montemolín, son of Don Carlos. Such an arrangement would 
have mitigated the underlying tensions between Isabelinos and Carlistas. Ultimately, no agreement was 
reached, not least because of Carlos Luis’ refusal to be king consort, which is the compromise Jaume 
Balmes had suggested. Shortly after the marriage of Isabella to Francisco de Asís de Borbón, the 
insurrection set off. We are left, however, with an interesting entry in Donoso’s diary, from the sidelines 
of his meeting with Guizot. While agreeing with Guizot that at the time the marriage was not viable, “I 
will not say the same further on; if revolution threatens us, a good many of the moderados will see in 
this marriage the only hope. If the threats of revolution coincide with the moderation of the Carlists in 
such a way that they do not aspire to more than the Count of Montemolín being the husband of Spain, 
then the whole thing would seem probable.” Donoso seems to have considered Carlist insurrectionism 
as a resource-consuming splinter from the necessarily broad-based counterrevolutionary coalition, and 
a disturbance from the real challenge at hand which was the containment of the revolution, that required 
every effort. Suárez, Vida y Obra de Juan Donoso Cortés, 582. 
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literally, “territorial unity is the first and most essential of all unities; political unity, 
moral unity, religious unity, without territorial unity, all are scant.”119   
For Donoso, this was the concrete political problem pervasive in Spain. The 
Iberian Peninsula, despite its relatively small size, is an ethno-linguistically intricate 
and geographically problematic territory. The breakdown of the principle of authority 
complicated Spain’s persistent problem of political unity. The problem was 
compounded by Spain’s national character. Per Donoso, “the historical character of 
Spaniards is to exaggerate everything: we exaggerate virtues and vices, things great and 
small...we have only socialism left to exaggerate, and we shall exaggerate it surely. 
Then you will see what Spaniards are enamored of an idea good or bad.”120  
It is in this sense that Carlists became a threat to authority and the integrity of 
political society. Bartyzel, who sympathizes with the Carlist cause, captures Donoso’s 
inclinations throughout the dynastic dispute, 
Donoso Cortés declared himself in favor of the usurpers: he was a trusted 
counselor to the regent (whom he assisted during her exile in Paris in 1840-43) 
and preceptor of her daughter, Queen Isabella. He considered the Carlists, the 
ultra-Catholic traditionalists and legitimists, ‘right-wing anarchists,’ as 
dangerous to political and social order as the left-wing revolutionaries.121 
Surely, Donoso’s personal history with María Christina and Isabella II played 
into his unwavering support of the Isabeline camp. But setting personal loyalties aside, 
anything but supporting the continuity of the monarchy would have also been a betrayal 
of the unity of the social organism. Grounded in this premise, Donoso surveyed Spain’s 
political landscape, from the center of political power of the Isabeline regime, to the 
periphery. From that vantage point, the centrifugal forces embodied in Carlismo were, 
above all, a challenge to authority.  
Carlist defiance activated Donoso’s fundamentally authoritarian instincts. On 
one occasion, Donoso had defined himself as “a man of Government, a man of 
Government before all and above all; and man of Government, I vote always with the 
 
119 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre las relaciones con otras potencias, 171. This is the most geopolitical 
of Donoso’s speeches. In it, he exposes the realist crust of his political thought. 
120 Donoso Cortés, Correspondencia con el conde Raczynski, 935. 




Government in case of doubt.”122 Even before that, in the prologue to the 1834 
Consideraciones sobre la diplomacia, upon the slaying of friars by a mob in Madrid, 
and with the First Carlist War raging in the background—with the Carlists led by the 
“disloyal prince”—Donoso called for the government to “defend the throne, consolidate 
freedom, suffocate anarchy.” Donoso implied that anarchy could come from all sides, 
and creep into the center. He also revealed the lifelong political priorities that would 
dominate his statecraft.123 
The Limits of Realism 
We consider Donoso’s situational conservatism a form of political realism, 
insofar as it is premised on the practical defense of concrete institutions, rather than in 
abstract ideation. At times, it appears that Donoso’s political philosophy is wholly 
functional and oriented towards his political objectives. If this were a true assessment, 
his philosophy would command no autonomous value. 
Unquestionably, there were functionalist elements in Donoso’s statecraft. His 
early formulation of the sovereignty of intelligence, for example, contains within it a 
consequentialist logic. A theory of sovereignty that elevates intelligence, insofar as 
intelligence is selectively distributed in the body politic, yielded a desirably hierarchical 
society. In contrast, a theory erected on the will, possessed indiscriminately by all, 
would render an egalitarianism unacceptable to an elitist such as Donoso. Further down 
the line, trinitarian dogma provided Donoso with a stronger foundation for authority. 
Dogma was located in a theological dimension, beyond the “universal dissolvent” of 
what Donoso calls the “discussing class” (the liberal bourgeoisie), and the demands of 
the revolution.124 Again, Donoso was adopting a theory, at least partly because it was 
functional to the principle of authority and the integrity of society.  
Casual commentators have also noticed the realist streaks in Donoso’s praxis. 
Often, his realism is juxtaposed with the vivid imagery of his oratory and prose. Eugenio 
d’Ors best encapsulated Donoso’s dynamism and mercurial genius in his memorable 
 
122 Garrido Muro, “‘Cómo organizar el caos’: Donoso Cortés en la política española,” 56-57. 
123 Donoso Cortés, Consideraciones sobre la diplomacia, 227-228. 
124 Valverde, introduction to Obras completas de Juan Donoso Cortés, 124.  
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formulation cálido retórico, frío político.125 Donoso was the fiery rhetorician who, in 
the words of Menéndez Pelayo, “speaks and writes as if through lightning; he lays 
siege...to the towers of the ideal, and every speech seems like a victorious incursion into 
the province of ideas madre.” On top of this, he was also the political expert, the 
éminence grise behind palace intrigues, and the penetrating geopolitical analyst.126 
Beyond Functionalism 
Notwithstanding its functionalist and consequentialist elements, accounting for 
Donoso’s realism is necessary but not sufficient for an integral account of Donoso’s 
statecraft. His situational conservatism is, in the final analysis, derived from normative 
premises. Ultimately, Donoso willingly accepted and external limit to his realpolitik.  
Donoso’s own definition of statesmanship contained the dramatic tension 
between political activity and the upper limit of Christian ethics, 
If I were asked what is the special character that distinguishes the statesman, I 
would say that it is the instinct that discerns the questions in which there may be 
transaction, the questions in which it is possible to concede, and the questions 
that cannot be compromise and cannot be abandoned.127 
Donoso, however, never spelled out the precise content of this limit. Can we 
meaningfully situate this limit? To the extent that it is felt throughout his political 
biography, it is worth pursuing this angle. Our task then is to approximate it as best we 
can.  
We may begin by observing that only the existence of such an ethical limit, 
sincerely internalized, could have elicited the sort of discernment that characterized the 
 
125 Or “warm rhetorician, cold politician.” Villar Borda, Donoso Cortés y Carl Schmitt, 172. 
126 Menéndez Pelayo, Historia de los heterodoxos españoles, 1517; As a student of Russia, Donoso’s 
observations predate those of George F. Kennan, the American diplomat who devised the Cold War 
policy of containment. Arguably, Donoso penetrated deeper historico-theological regions than Kennan. 
“A man who in 1848 foresaw that the future socialist revolution would not explode in London but in 
Saint Petersburg, and that already in 1848 saw in the union of socialism and slavism the decisive event 
of the coming generation, is a political thinker with the rare faculty of glimpsing, through combined 
constructions, the ideological motives of men in their final political consequences, who deserves to be 
studied even when, with a style that today seems dated, he enters into the field of theology,” said Schmitt 
of Donoso’s geopolitical insight. Schmitt, Interpretación Europea de Donoso Cortés, 141. 
127 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre las relaciones con otras potencias, 171. 
44 
 
late Donoso.128  Although the loose collection of characterizations we have collated 
above, including d’Ors’ famous meme, neglect Donoso’s crisis, we know otherwise. 
Donoso’s moral imagination is important as a characteristic of Donoso’s political 
thought.  
Despite Donoso’s commitment to the Christian ideal, it must have been obvious 
to him, as it is for us today, that the spheres of political action and ethics could not 
possibly overlap completely in practice. Man always fell short of the ethical ideal. It 
couldn’t be any other way for Donoso, insofar as he embraced the doctrine of Original 
Sin, and did so with increasing intensity. The Christian ideal, no matter how far he 
remained from it, was however present in his politics. Donoso measured all his activity 
against it. Normatively, at least, the sphere of political activity was to remain within the 
sphere of ethics.  
Donoso Versus the Machiavellians 
To better approximate the upper limit of Donoso’s statecraft, it is instructive to 
compare him to a political realist of a very different sort, namely, Niccolò Machiavelli, 
the Renaissance progenitor of realpolitik. At first glance, there are amusing parallels 
between the political lives of Donoso and Machiavelli. They occupied similar positions 
in the body politic: both acted as civil servants, diplomats and advisors to monarchs—
but never as protagonists or heads of state. They also shared a realist belief in an 
imperfect world (surely, an outlook that predated and outlived the author of The Prince). 
Valverde even noted Machiavellian instincts in Donoso “when idealism descends to 
realism, it is to encounter a historical man to whom he frequently denies all ideal 
character, and so it is reminiscent of Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’.”129  
Despite this partial biographical and anthropological overlap, statecraft is 
perceived in radically different terms. In The Prince, the standard for political action 
 
128 We have considered Max Weber’s landmark study of political ethics. Weber drew a clear theoretical 
distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. The convinced politician 
prioritizes his ideas and principles. The responsible politician knows that ideas and principles are 
generalities that are hardly applicable and that he must often make concessions, at times extensive, in 
order to advance his cause and the reforms he espouses. Concretely, both types coexist in the statesman. 
Weber never purports to resolve the dramatic tension between these two ethical dispositions. Weber, 
Politics as a Vocation; we have also relied on Fernández García, Filosofía política y derecho. 
129 Valverde, introduction to Obras completas de Juan Donoso Cortés, 193.  
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Machiavelli proposed was necessity.130 The prince had to direct his political action 
towards maintaining the state, and the ends justified whatever means are employed.131 
Thus we have Machiavelli’s well known maxim, that the statesman must do whatever 
is necessary to mantenere lo stato.132  
Machiavelli also proposed a set of virtues, constitutive of virtù and distinct from 
Christian virtue, conducive to the maintenance of the state, and the expansion of its 
glory.133 For Machiavelli, pagan values were courage, strength, achievement, discipline, 
vigor and fortitude. Christian values, instead, were mercy, charity, sacrifice, forgiveness 
of one’s enemies, contempt for the goods of this world and faith in an afterlife.134 
Machiavelli’s original insight—and in affirming this we are following Berlin—was that 
 
130 “It is essential for a Prince who desires to maintain his position, to have learned how to be other than 
good, and to use or not to use his goodness as necessity requires” Machiavelli, The Prince, 40.  
131 “And you are to understand...that a Prince...cannot observe all those rules of conduct in respect 
whereof men are accounted good, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act in opposition 
to good faith, charity, humanity and religion.” Machiavelli, The Prince,  46. 
132 Leo Strauss considered that Machiavelli had spearheaded political modernity by reversing the 
classical relationship between the state and virtue. For Machiavelli, says Strauss, “virtue must not be 
understood as that for the sake of which the commonwealth exists, but virtue exists exclusively for the 
sake of the commonwealth; political life proper is not subject to morality; morality is not possible 
outside of political society; it presupposes political society; political society cannot be established and 
preserved by staying within the limits of morality, for the simple reason that the effect or the conditioned 
cannot precede the cause or condition” Strauss, “The Three Waves of Modernity,” 86-87; In 
Machiavelli’s universe, two variables determined the statesman’s success in maintaining the state. Virtù 
stood for the prowess, proficiency and power through which a man can bend the will of others and take 
control of history. Fortuna meant all the fortuitous forces that escape our control. History, in this view, 
is an irresoluble tension between the two. Thus, the Machiavellian calculus of successful statecraft was 
the maximization of virtù and the minimization, or taming of, fortuna.  
133 It is important to stress that Machiavelli’s idea of statecraft was, as much as Donoso’s, informed by 
ethics. For Machiavelli, the sphere of political activity was also to remain within the sphere of ethics. 
But it is a very different ethical universe.  Here, we agree with Isaiah Berlin.  Alternatively, that 
Machiavelli was the first to sever politics from ethics had been the persuasion of the classic studies by 
Benedetto Croce, Jacques Maritain and Allan H. Gilbert. Regardless, their reflections are surely worth 
recovering. Gilbert said “In these things lies the true originality of Machiavelli; all may be used up in 
his conviction that government is an independent art in an imperfect world.” Maritain said “Finally, the 
‘grammar of power’ and the recipes of success written by Machiavelli are the work of a pure artist, and 
of a pure artist of that Italian Renaissance where the great heritage of the antique and Christian mind, 
falling in jeopardy, blossomed into the most beautiful, delightful and poisonous flowers. What makes 
the study of Machiavelli extremely instructive for a philosopher, is the fact that nowhere is it possible 
to find a more purely artistic conception of politics. And here is his chief philosophical fault, if it is true 
that politics belongs to the field of the ‘praktikon’ (to do), not of the ‘poietikon’ (to make), and is by 
essence a branch—the principal branch, according to Aristotle-of ethics...Thus, merely artistic politics, 
liberated from ethics, that is, from the practical knowledge of man, from the science of human acts, 
from truly human finalities and truly human doings, is a corpse of political wisdom and practical 
prudence.” Maritain, “The End of Machiavellianism,” 7. 
134 Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, 45. 
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he recognized that these two  sets of practical virtues as mutually exclusive. Machiavelli 
did not make explicit the rejection of Christianity in favor of paganism, although he 
definitely deemed the latter to be superior for ruling and the public domain. Instead, 
Machiavelli placed the two sets of values “side by side, with the implicit invitation to 
men to choose either a good, virtuous, private life, or a good, successful, social 
existence, but not both.”135 
One possible objection to the radical bifurcation attributed to Machiavelli by 
Berlin would be to question the claim of incompatibility between Christian and pagan 
virtues. Fortitude, for instance, is one of the cardinal virtues in the Catholic tradition of 
which Donoso is a part of. In turn, this tradition understands itself as building upon, 
complementing and elevating the horizons of the so-called noble pagans and proto-
Christians such as Plato. 
Even if in fact we were to relax Machiavelli’s claims of exclusivity, Donoso’s 
crisis does appear to unfold between the poles of piety and virtù, under the terms posited 
by Machiavelli, as expounded by Berlin.136 Indeed, Donoso himself, who is human—
all too human— confessed to be lured by glory championed by Machiavelli, as in the 
manuscript reproduced in Part I. In Donoso’s time, the capacity to actualize the 
temptation to the worldly kingdoms was amplified significantly by the power and 
technology at the disposal of the practitioner of the new statecraft. 
But to Donoso, the trade-off between religious limits and pagan glory came at a 
very real cost. The moral emergency was not merely a figment of the imagination. The 
immortal soul was at stake. Thus, there were modes of statecraft that Machiavelli would 
have been willing to pursue, bent on his maxim to mantenere lo stato, that Donoso 
rejected, at least hypothetically. In the 1848 Discurso sobre la dictadura, for example, 
Donoso proclaimed, “Two things are impossible to me: condemning dictatorship and 
exercising it. That is why...I am incapacitated to govern; I cannot accept government in 
 
135 Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, 71. 
136 Most likely unconsciously, for Donoso scarcely mentioned Machiavelli throughout his oeuvre. 
47 
 
conscience; I could not accept it without placing half of myself at war with the other 
half, without placing my instinct and reason at war.”137  
Donoso was not exactly a Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus or a Jefferson, both of 
whom renounced power from the pinnacle of the body politic. Donoso never reached 
such heights. Nevertheless, the Discurso sobre la dictadura reveals reluctance in 
Donoso’s attitude towards raw political power.  He was persistently unwilling to lose 
sight of the religious limit, even with the health of the polity at stake. Donoso never 
sought to amass power for its own sake, not even in the potentially advantageous 
revolutionary moment when political power was reshuffled. Certainly, in terms of 
political praxis, the exigencies of Christian statesmanship proved more restrictive than 
those of pagan virtù. 
Thus, while Machiavelli and Donoso are brought together by biographical 
parallels and certain realist traits, they are set apart by the specifically Christian limit 
that permeated Donoso’s practical statecraft. Donoso’s arduous pondering, and his 
eventual crisis of statecraft would have seemed like an excessive burden to Machiavelli: 
an unnecessary restraint on the glory of virtù. If we were to follow Machiavelli’s 
mundane criterion strictly, Donoso would be a prime candidate to be one of his torn 
men, who wander between the two competing sets of values, and who “take certain 
middle ways that are very injurious, they are unable to be altogether good or altogether 
bad”, and who, in sum, vacillate and fail.138  
No doubt, Donoso did not operate politically according to Machiavelli’s 
criterion, privileging the mundane. He had faith in a transcendent reality, as well as in 
an immanent reality where religious limits to action exist in relation to higher and truer 
reality. This was the criterion against which all men were to measure their actions, 
including statesmen. Donoso never lost sight of this upper limit in his political practice, 
seeing that this limit could be shunned, but ultimately never ignored. 
In sum, Donoso was a melancholy statesman, that carried his cross until the end, 
a weight that the Machiavellians will continue to consider as the impediment of heavy 
 
137 “This is why, gentleman, and I appeal to the testimony of all those who know me, none can stand 
up, here nor outside of here, who have stumbled upon me in the path of ambition, so full with people,” 
continues Donoso. Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 306-307.  
138  Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, 47. 
48 
 
baggage.139 Donoso thought of himself, not as an artist of the political as the Machiavelli 
of Maritain, but as an agent of order, guided by the principle of authority. His duty as a 
statesman was not creative but defensive. It was to secure the conditions for religion to 
flourish. If we trace the etymology of the word religion, we will find the Latin religare, 
or “to religate.” And that, for Donoso, was precisely the task of the altar, and not of the 
throne: to bind us anew to the Divine. 
Against Political Eschatologies 
We have examined how Machiavelli and Donoso set out from similar realist 
anthropologies of man as a deeply imperfect creature. But Donoso consciously carried 
out his statecraft within a specifically Christian eschatology, unlike Machiavelli.  
For the most part, Donoso got hold of Augustine’s theology of history. In fact, 
the philosopher of history Karl Löwith considered Donoso’s Ensayo as another Civitas 
Dei.140 “While the lords of the history of the world are Alexanders and Caesars, 
Napoleons and Hitlers, Jesus Christ is the Lord of the Kingdom of God and therefore of 
secular history only in so far as the history of the world hides a redemptive 
meaning...merely as a background and as empirical instruments in God’s dealing with 
man are empires and world-historical persons drawn into the orbit of the biblical 
perspective of history in the Old and New testament,” writes Löwith in his Meaning in 
History.141 Presumably then, Machiavelli’s pagan ethic of virtù and glory paled next to 
Christianity’s hold on the redemptive key of history, assumed by Donoso. 
According to this understanding of history, temporal power inevitably decayed, 
just as the ancient Republics that Machiavelli revered also perished. Augustine, says 
Löwith, “rejects the traditional interpretation of Rome as the fourth empire of Daniel’s 
prophecy, because he rejects in principle any world-historical, i.e., political 
 
139 We have found parallels between Donoso and “St. Augustine’s melancholy soldier, who understood 
both that his war was just and that killing, even in a just war, is a terrible thing to do.” Walzer, “Political 
Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” 167.  
140 “If the idea of progress had been presented to a Greek, it would have struck him as irreligious, 
defying cosmic order and fate. And when it was presented to a radical Christian of the nineteenth 
century, it had the same effect. Challenged by Proudhon’s thesis that each of our progress is a victory 
by which we crush providential divinity, Donoso Cortés answered with another Civitas Dei.” Löwith, 
Meaning in History, 200. 
141 Löwith, Meaning in History, 187. 
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eschatology. Augustine personally believed in the survival of the Roman Empire, but 
he considered neither the survival nor the decline of an empire as a matter of final 
importance in the order of the last things.”142  
Donoso was a realist in this Augustinian tradition.143 Like Augustine, he did not 
expect too much of this world, nor of its politics.144 He accepted the reality of our fallen 
condition amidst the civitas terrena and the limits it imposed on temporal order. The 
vehicle for Christian universalism was the Church before the empire.145 The former was 
the custodian of redemptive forces and the promise of salvation.  
 
142 Löwith, Meaning in History, 168. 
143 We have worked with Henry Bettenson’s translation of City of God; Diego Sevilla Andrés has 
dedicated several studies to expounding this relationship. See for example Sevilla Andrés, “El impacto 
de San Agustín en Donoso. Las ‘Dos Ciudades’ y las ‘Dos Civilizaciones.’”; This brand of realism is 
an old one in Christianity. While the standard-bearer within the Catholic tradition is Saint Augustine, it 
is present in nineteenth century statecraft through the influential protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr 
and his political disciples, notably the diplomat George F. Kennan. 
144 The parallels between Donoso Cortés and the English philosopher Michael Oakeshott are plenty and 
theoretically fruitful. The latter’s distinction between the “politics of faith” and the “politics of 
scepticism” illuminates our discussion. These two “styles” of politics are the poles to which the 
pendulum of modern politics swings to. The politics of faith “understands governing as an ‘unlimited’ 
activity’; government is omnicompetent...the object in government is ‘salvation’ or ‘perfection.’” 
Oakeshott identified a common root in all the modern iterations of the politics of faith. Namely, 
Pelagianism: a heresy that denies the lasting effects of the fall to the point that perfection is achievable 
through the exercise of our free will without the aid of divine grace. Notably, Donoso had written to 
Cardinal Fornari that all modern errors could be boiled down to heresies long condemned by the Church. 
In Oakeshott’s account, Spinoza, Pascal, Hobbes, Hume, Montesquieu, Burke, Paine, Bentham, Hegel, 
Coleridge, Calhoun and Macaulay conform the ranks of skepticism (in turn, we may add Donoso to the 
list). In spite of their obvious differences, they all rejected “the belief that governing is the imposition 
of a comprehensive pattern of activity upon a community and a consequent suspicion of government 
invested with overwhelming power.” Of course, Donoso was a skeptic strictly in the political sphere. 
Elsewhere, he embraced a comprehensive and fideistic way of being in the world, namely, Catholicism. 
He was not skeptical of absolute claims, which the Church had the authority to teach, but rather 
scrutinous of their source, particularly if it was political; According to Oakeshott the most influential 
exponent of the politics of skepticism was Augustine, who theorized the distinction between politics 
and religion, “the earliest triumph of the politics of scepticism.” After Augustine, it been the task of the 
skeptics to “recall political activity from the frontier of religion, and to be always drawing attention to 
the values of civil order and tranquillitas whenever the vision of a total pattern of activity, imposed 
because it is believed to represent ‘truth’ or ‘justice,’ threatens to obliterate everything else.” Oakeshott, 
The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, 80-81. 
145 It is a theme that the categories of modern political theory are theological concepts that have been 
secularized. In Löwith’s account of the process, “The revolution which had been proclaimed within the 
framework of an eschatological faith and with reference to a perfect monastic life was taken over, five 
centuries later, by a philosophical priesthood, which interpreted the process of secularization as a 
‘spiritual’ realization of the Kingdom of God on earth. As an attempt at realization, the spiritual pattern 
of Lessing, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel could be transposed into the positivistic and materialistic 
schemes of Comte and Marx. The third dispensation of the Joachites [Franciscan followers of Joachim 
of Fiori] reappeared as a third International and a third Reich, inaugurated by a dux or a Führer who 
was acclaimed as a savior and acclaimed by millions with Heil! The source of all formidable attempts 
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Donoso, Christian Realist 
The specifically Christian character of Donoso’s realism was its subordination 
to this eschatological apparatus. Thus, the philosophical sources of Donosian and 
Machiavellian realism, Christian and pagan respectively, set them on divergent 
trajectories of statecraft in practice.146 Together, Donoso’s spiritual Augustinianism and 
practical situational conservatism made him a Christian realist.  
Beyond this core eschatological vision, Donoso’s realism was sensitive to the 
particularities of political cultures, and the elements that make concrete political orders 
workable. In Donoso’s words, “the philosophers generally have up until now classified 
Governments by their forms; we shall classify them for their diverse tendencies to 
resolve the social problem, and this classification shall be more luminous and 
profound.”147 Governments then, in their diverse forms and configurations, were to be 
judged by their ability to uphold the principle of authority and preserve the integrity of 
society. 
Donoso’s criterion was largely consistent with the Catholic Church’s position 
with respect to particular political forms. Imatz has commented that Donoso reflects 
“the traditionalist Catholic points of view by which a consequent Catholic must become 
monarchical or republican insofar as the monarchy or the republic guarantee the 
conservation and prosperity of religion.”148 Historically, at the very least in her 
magisterium, the Church does not wed itself to any regime type, so long as her rights 
and those of God are preserved. 
If we consider once again the Donosian principle of authority and the underlying 
law of unity and variety, we find that it was dogmatic in the abstract, but remarkably 
open about its configuration on the historically-determined, concrete and uneven 
political canvas. Beneath a supra-rational kernel of ultimate ends that was non-
 
to fulfil history by and within itself is the passionate but fearful and humble expectation of Franciscan 
Spirituals, that a last conflict will bring history to its climax and end.” Löwith, Meaning in History, 159. 
In our view, Donoso was the original and deepest interpreter of the socialist incarnation of Christian 
Eschatology. 
146 While deeply attuned to the fallenness of man, Christian realism offers the accompanying doctrines 
of elevating grace, the repose of forgiveness and the promise of redemption, concepts that Machiavelli’s 
pagan world of virtú is devoid of. 
147 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 335. 
148 Donoso Cortés, Contra el liberalismo, 67.  
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negotiable, there appears to have been flexibility for the selection of proximate means, 
the formulation of rational objectives, and the execution of a realist statecraft.  
In this light, it is worth briefly returning to the folk theory. The folk theory has 
been based on the notion of a conversion, including political conversion whereby 
Donoso moved from doctrinaire liberalism to traditionalism. A great deal has been 
written within the folk theory about the coherence of Donoso’s ideology and political 
affiliation. In response, we have attempted to show that Donoso’ theory of authority and 
government make up the core of his statecraft.  
In our analysis, these oscillations between political camps are superficial, and 
respond to the deeper requirements of Donoso’s rationale for Catholic statecraft—to 
defend divine authority by way of government action and to conserve social integrity. 
Thus, Donoso was afforded room to maneuver between ideologies. At the end of the 
day, ideologies were to be judged with respect to their tendency to preserve authority, 
given the underlying social conditions. And Donoso maneuvered without falling into—
at least not terminally—the ideological contradictions that so much of Donosian 
literature is keen to highlight.  
Ideologies as well as situational conservatism were always under the aegis of 
Donoso’s style of Christian realism. Donoso’s course of action is accurately reflected 
in what Winston Churchill described as “keeping the ship on an even keel,” which in 
politics is “the truest consistency.”149  
Statecraft for the Freedom of the Church  
Still, social conservation was not the ultimate mundane end to which Donoso’s 
statecraft was ordered. There was in Donoso a constant if indirect concern with the 
preservation of the freedom of the Catholic Church amid the temporal order.  
 
149 “A statesman, in contact with the moving current of events and anxious to keep the ship on an even 
keel and steer a steady course, may lean all his weight now on one side and now on the other. His 
arguments in each case, when contrasted, can be shown to be not only very different in character, but 
contradictory in spirit and opposite in direction: yet his object will throughout have remained the same. 
His resolves, his wishes, his outlook may have been unchanged, his methods may be verbally 
irreconcilable. We cannot call this inconsistency. In fact it may be claimed to be the truest consistency. 
The only way a man can remain consistent amid changing circumstances is to change with them while 
preserving the same dominating purpose” Smith, Political Philosophy, 255-256. 
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To begin to grasp the relationship between means and ends at play, we may 
recover Kennedy’s assertion that for Donoso, when it came to the Social Question, “the 
cure lay far beyond the province of government”, and with “the forces of religion.”150 
Indeed, the Discurso sobre la dictadura, Donoso relativized the scope of the 
commissary dictatorship he was simultaneously proposing: 
One thing alone can avoid catastrophe, one and no more; [catastrophe] cannot be 
avoided by giving out more freedom, more guarantees, new constitutions, 
[catastrophe] is avoided by all of us procuring, so far as our strength reaches, 
provoke a healthy, religious reaction. Now, is this religious reaction possible? It 
is possible; but, is it probable? Gentlemen, here I speak with the deepest sadness; 
I do not believe it probable. I have seen and met many individuals that left faith 
and came back to it; unfortunately, I have never seen a people return to faith after 
having lost it.151 
And yet it does not follow from this speech, nor from primacy of the spiritual 
over the temporal inherent to Donoso’s Augustinian tradition, that statecraft is 
superfluous. The second part of Kennedy’s argument implied that participating in 
statecraft entails hypocrisy.152 In point of fact, for Donoso, statecraft has an ancillary 
but critical mission. 
To grasp the fundamental importance of government, we must first recall 
Donoso’s cosmology. We have already explored Donoso’s metaphysical notion of 
authority. His view in the Lecciones was that authority was simply theocentric. By the 
time of the Ensayo, it would take on a specifically Catholic theological depth by 
alluding also to the Holy Trinity as the keystone of the law of unity and variety. The 
Universe was the variety of hierarchy and the unity of divine authority. In Donoso’s 
mind, the Church in its temporal and social dimension was ingrained in the fabric of 
Creation. As we have seen, government was the activity by which the social organism 
kept itself together; preserving order, while respecting freedom. To govern was to resist, 
said Donoso. It was incumbent upon government to prevent intrusions on the organic 
 
150 Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State”, 523. 
151 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 320. 
152 “And at any rate the cure [to the Social Question] lay far beyond the province of government. But 
the man of action refused to be consistent: he continued to be the energetic servant of government and 
to act as though the institutions government were still of basic importance.” Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés 
as Servant of the State,” 522. Pace Kennedy, Donoso is actually convinced of the crucial purpose of 
government. Namely, to carve out a temporal peace for the Church. 
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social whole that the Church represented. Thus, government was purposed with freeing 
the Church to function in its temporal dimension.153 
According to Catholic doctrine, the Church must fundamentally be understood 
as part of the spiritual order. It is the Mystici corporis Christi, or the Mystical Body of 
Christ on Earth.154 Regarding the relationship between the Mystical Body and political 
Augustinianism, Quentin Skinner writes that “Augustine had pictured political society 
as a divinely ordained order imposed on fallen men as a remedy for their 
sins...Augustine’s view of political society had merely been ancillary to an eschatology 
in which the life of the pilgrim on earth had been seen as little more than a preparation 
for the life to come.”155 The Church as the Mystical Body existed so that our souls may 
be saved. Donoso’s statecraft was, at the highest level, aimed at defending the freedom 
of the Church as the Navis Petri or “Barque of St. Peter.”  
Donoso placed his political realism of particulars in service of his spiritual 
idealism of universals. His ideal was not government but the Roman Church, the true 
custodian of man’s link to the Transcendent. Schmitt noted that Donoso’s uniquely 
permanent political position is to secure the freedom of the Church, 
The only thing that remains inalterable through the changes of ideas is 
[Donoso’s] interest for the Papal States and for the sovereignty of the Pope. For 
the rest, he follows changes in the situation to the day. He does not think of 
declaring himself a fixed proponent of this or that system of foreign policy. 
 
153 With respect to the pilgrim Church on Earth and its relation to political society, Donoso merely 
affirmed the doctrine of the Gelasian Dyarchy, by which temporal power is a separate sphere, that is 
nonetheless indirectly subordinated to the eternal authority of the Church. To be sure, in actuality the 
proper delineation of temporal power with respect to spiritual power is not the sealed discussion Donoso 
takes it to be in theory. Indeed, it was the central political question running through the Middle Ages. 
The issue is obviously less prevalent in today’s “secular” West, but nonetheless vital to those concerned 
with the meaning of rendering to God and Caesar what is rightfully theirs. Donoso for one considered 
that the Church was the first to teach “the distinction between civil and religious power, between God 
and Caesar, between the pontiff and the king...a most fecund truth, unknown to the peoples until the 
Catholic Church revealed it to the world.” Donoso Cortés, Pío IX, 199; In the same way Donoso 
dismisses charges of absolutism, as we will see in Chapter III, he dismisses those of theocracy. In his 
1852 Carta al Director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes’, Donoso will ascertain that “In the same way 
that submission to divine precepts does not carry, explicit or implicitly, the institution of a theocratic 
government; the recognition in theory and practice, of the fundamental truths of which the Church is 
depositary, does not carry with it…its domination in temporal matters. Never has the Church confused 
these two things…while it seeks and asks for its principles the empire of the world…it has always 
shown departure from, if not horror at interfering with the temporal direction of human things.” Donoso 
Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 766. While the historical accuracy of such a 
claim is obviously questionable, this does not bear on the validity of the ideal. 
154 Pius XII, Mystici corporis Christi. 
155 Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 50. 
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England is not always considered by him as an adversary, nor Russia, as a 
conservative power, as an unquestionable ally.156  
Schmitt also pointed to the frequent changes in Donoso’s foreign policy positions. At 
different points in his diplomatic dispatches, Donoso feared German unification along 
Prussian nationalistic and essentially protestant lines; he expressed reservations for 
Louis Napoleon’s reactionary populism; and for a moment even considered that 
England could be a conservative force for good in the continent—if only Newman and 
the Oxford Movement could lead her back to Catholic tracks. Through all of these 
thoughts, Donoso’s orientation to Rome was unwavering.157 
At the highest level of abstraction, society was to be kept as a coherent whole, 
that the Church of Rome may deploy its saving power and the supernatural forces of 
religion may act on its members individually. Notwithstanding his lifelong pessimism 
with respect to the possibilities of political success, statecraft, as understood by Donoso, 
had to pursue the limited aim of carving out a peace for the freedom of the Church, by 
which religious renewal could take place. 
This was also the policy that Donoso pursued concretely, in the context of the 
Revolutions of 1848 in the Italian states. The revolution had erupted in Rome and the 
Republic of Mazzini, Saffi and Armellini was declared. Pellegrino Rossi, who had been 
Donoso’s doctrinaire liberal counterpart in the Polémica con el Dr. Rossi, and who had 
since been appointed papal premier, was assassinated. Pope Pius IX was forced to flee 
to Gaeta.  In response, the Pope had called upon the Catholic powers; Austria, France, 
Spain and the Two Sicilies to restore his authority.  
Donoso interceded diplomatically in favor of the papacy, and Narvaéz’s 
government sent an expeditionary force to Gaeta that ultimately saw minimal action.158 
Napoleon III, seeking to consolidate his conservative coalition domestically, to recover 
France’s prestige amongst Catholic Europe abroad, and to dispute Austria’s influence 
 
156 Schmitt, Interpretación Europea de Donoso Cortés, 122. 
157 Gowan, “Donoso Cortés: Un Español Singular,” 177. 
158 Donoso Cortés, Despachos desde Berlín (1849), 347-351; It is hard to gauge the specific impact of 
Donoso’s diplomatic dealings solely from the dispatch to Narvaéz reproduced by Valverde. Suárez’s 
biography provides additional detail on the exchanges between Donoso, Narvaéz, and his minister Pedro 
José Pidal, suggesting that Donoso influenced both to finally send the troops. Suárez, Vida y Obra de 
Juan Donoso Cortés, 709-710. 
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in the Italian peninsula, sent a military contingent that laid siege to Rome and restored 
the Pope in 1849. 
Rather than intervening directly, the Spanish government set up a system of 
international diplomatic conferences amongst Catholic nations in Gaeta to coordinate 
their actions. A diplomatic dispatch doubting the effectiveness of these conferences 
reveals Donoso’s realist instincts.159 “Instead,” wrote Donoso, “I would have begun by 
sending troops and then I would have invited all the Catholic peoples to act accordingly; 
having verified the restoration, I would have provoked a congress, with the purpose of 
introducing in European public law a series of principles, whose official proclamation 
has been made necessary by the latest revolts.”160  
At any rate, Donoso made explicit this “series of principles” regarding the 
temporal power of the Church (at that point embodied in the Papal States), and the 
concomitant policy positions. 
The temporal power of the pope, the unique guarantee of his spiritual 
independence, is placed, de facto and de jure, under the protection of the Catholic 
world. The Catholic world, composed of independent and sovereign nations, the 
right and the duty to protect the Supreme Pontiff in his still possession of his 
temporal sovereignty resides completely in all of them together and in each of 
them separately in solidum.161 
Furthermore, 
The Catholic world has the right to demand the independence of the Supreme 
Pontiff. As the only guarantee of his independence, it has the right to demand he 
be sovereign. Since the pope can cease to be sovereign through his own 
abandonment or by the usurpation of his people, it is declared that the pope can 
not diminish his own power motu propio, nor can the people through any 
declaration or contract of sorts. As a guarantee against a liberal pope [liberal in 
this context meaning attuned to the cause of the Italian nationalists], the Catholic 
world would demand the explicit recognition of these principles by the popes; as 
the popes guarantee against the people, the Catholic world would proclaim its 
right to garrison Rome; as the pope’s guarantee against foreign nations, the 
temporal denaturalization of the troops garrisoning rome would be proclaimed, 
 
159 “Generally speaking, diplomatic conferences do not serve to annul the consummated facts, but to 
give them a certain legitimacy through the consent of the peoples. A congress will not be of much use 
to restore the Pope; it will be of use to prevent a new downfall after having restored him.” Donoso 
Cortés, Despachos desde Berlín (1849), 350. 
160 Donoso Cortés, Despachos desde Berlín (1849), 350. 




subjecting them, during their time in service, to the exclusive authority of the 
pope.162 
 
The issue of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope is as fascinating as it is 
cumbersome.163 Addressing it in full beyond the scope of this investigation.164 
Nevertheless, our intention is to highlight Donoso’s position towards Rome, and his 
desire to incorporate the rights of a sovereign papacy into European law.  
Tying our reasoning back to the folk theory and its attempts at resolving 
Donoso’s political incoherence, we conclude instead that Donoso’s statecraft is made 
intelligible, not by conversion as in the folk theory, but by recognizing his overarching 
effort to conserve the integrity of society in order to secure the temporal independence 
of Church. 
 Given the predominance of Donoso’s Catholic universalism, we are inclined to 
consider his 1852 epistle Carta al Cardenal Fornari his crowning achievement.165 We 
also  suspect it to be the piece of statecraft which Donoso would have treasured the 
most, in light of its direct relation to the Throne of St. Peter. Cardinal Fornari, acting on 
behalf of the Pontiff Pius IX, in a supranational diplomatic effort commissioned a 
handful of thinkers with the intellectual task of addressing the sociopolitical challenges 
to the Catholic faith. Specifically, the task was to frame Catholic doctrine in the context 
of the Social Question and the mounting revolutionary pressures across Europe. Among 
them was Donoso, who provided a conceptual scheme and vocabulary to counteract the 
novel and pressing challenges of the 1848 revolutions.  
The epistle is described by Suárez as gaining in “precision, clarity and even 
logical force,” it is “pure and distilled thought, expressed in brilliant form...more austere 
and sober than previous writings.”166 In turn, we highlight the definitive equilibrium 
 
162 Donoso Cortés, Despachos desde Berlín (1849), 350. 
163 The so-called Roman Question was not mitigated until the Lateran Pacts of 1929. 
164 Donoso also addresses the question in the Discurso sobre la dictadura, amongst other places. Donoso 
Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 320-321. 
165 Per Suárez’s biography of Donoso, Louis Veuillot and the Donosian scholars Hans Juretschke and 
Santiago Galindo Herrero considered this Donoso’s best written work. Suárez, Vida y Obra de Juan 
Donoso Cortés, 994. 
166 Suárez, Vida y Obra de Juan Donoso Cortés, 995. 
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Donoso’s thought reaches between material and spiritual interests.167 At any rate, the 
letter to Fornari certainly constitutes the most synthetic exposition of Donoso’s mature 
thought. 
Donoso’s influence is felt in papal documents up until and including the 
publication of the Syllabus of Errors, published alongside the papal encyclical Quanta 
cura in 1864. In turn, Quanta cura would be followed by Rerum Novarum. Together, 
they would go on to conform the body of the Catholic Social Teaching, and inspire 
Christian Democracy and the political movements under its banner.168 
With respect to the supranational ends of statecraft, namely, the freedom of the 
universal Roman Church, Donoso summed the matter up clearly in the letter to Fornari, 
where he proclaimed “the superiority of Church over state or to say it all in one phrase 
the superiority of God over man.”169 
  
 
167 “It is absurd to suppose...that the religion that we profess and the Church that contains it arrest or 
look down upon the free expansion of public wealth, the correct solution of economic questions and the 
growth of material interests, because even if it is true that religion does not set out to make peoples 
potent, but blessed; nor to make men rich but holy, it is no less true that one of its noble teachings 
consists of the revelation to man of his providential commission to transform Nature whole and put it 
at his service by means of his labor. What the Church seeks is a certain equilibrium between material 
and moral and religious interests; what it seeks in that equilibrium is that...the first place be occupied 
by moral and religious interests followed by material interests...reason tells us and History shows us 
that only this preponderance can foil the great catastrophes latent wherever the preponderance or the 
exclusive growth of material interests ferments great concupiscences.” Donoso Cortés, Carta al 
Cardenal Fornari, 751-752. 
168 Monsegú, Clave teológica de la historia según Donoso Cortés, 26; According to Professor Imatz, 
Donoso Cortés can be considered a precursor of social Catholicism in its two versions: social-
traditionalist and social-liberal (later Christian Democrat).  Donoso Cortés, Contra el liberalismo, 62.  
169 Donoso Cortés, Carta al Cardenal Fornari, 759. 
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III. 1848: The Revolt Against Limits and the New 
Statecraft 
The Shifting Sands of Statecraft 
 
We are now in a stronger position to return to the crisis that opened our 
investigation. Donoso’ quandary set in as the qualitative and quantitative conditions of 
statecraft fundamentally changed. By 1848, the implicit and explicit scope of state 
action differed from what Donoso had encountered joining the ranks of the Ministry of 
Justice 1833 at 23 years of age. 
Donoso feared the convergence of socialist ideology, voluntarist masses, and 
technological capacity unto a single locus in the state. State capacity had increased 
rapidly, on the back of the rationalist impulse of centralization and transformational 
technologies such as the telegraph. The apparatus of repression was vast. There was 
nothing to oppose it as ancient moral and patrimonial resistances had been levelled. 
According to Alberto Spektorowski “the great problem for Donoso was society, which 
had been dissolved by a long process of secularization into the liberal tyrannical 
state.”170  
The 1848 Revolutions erupted simultaneously across the continent and 
consummated Donoso’s fears. He gazed into a new epoch in which a socialist 
movement backed by the principle of popular sovereignty and leveraging the physical 
force of the excitable masses, would conquer the means of state machinery to pursue its 
own ends. The limitation of power had become physically, technologically, and 
intellectually impossible given the climate of opinion in 1848 Europe.  
The Severing of the Links to Divine Authority 
The point in history had come when serving the state, paradoxically, meant 
rejecting the principle of authority.171 The self-legitimizing state, independent from 
 
170 Spektorowski, “Maistre, Donoso Cortés, and the Legacy of Catholic Authoritarianism,” 295. 
171 Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 65. This conundrum led a prominent Donosian scholar, 
Dietmar Westemeyer, to consider whether Donoso’s ideal society was stateless. Gallego García is 
correct to point out the difference between state (a historical political form) and government (the 
59 
 
society, was also emancipated from any notion of Pauline potestas, grounded in God. 
The decoupling of auctoritas and potestas appeared to be historically complete and 
politically irreversible. Only an unaccountable potestas remained, legitimizing a power 
unimagined by any ruler in history. And this unauthorized power was something that 
Donoso, who had been “a man of government,” would not serve. 
In this context, Donoso struggled to remain faithful to an energetic but limited 
style of Christian statecraft, that had been suitable for a world that was now expiring. 
Donoso arrived with an exhausted conception of government to this critical juncture in 
history. Donoso became increasingly frustrated given his awkward position in the 
emerging order, and wary of his complicity in the expansion of a totalizing state that 
was an affront to his fundamental vision of the Good. 
The Consolidation of the High-Modernist State 
Counterrevolutionaries, like Louis Napoleon, were not exempt from operating 
within this new paradigm of statist voluntarism. Hence, Donoso had mixed feelings for 
Napoleon’s Caesarism.172 Donoso valued his ability to arrest the revolution. But all the 
while, he knew all too well that the stage was set for socialist ideologues to conquer, in 
Napoleonic fashion, the newly independent machinery of the state. Per the account of 
James C. Scott in Seeing Like a State, this was a time in which the high-modernist state 
literally “discovered society,” to subjugate it through technical schemes of social 
perfection.173 
Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte described Napoleon 
III’s 1851 coup,   
All revolutions perfected [the state machinery] instead of breaking it. The parties, 
which alternately contended for domination, regarded the possession of this huge 
state structure as the chief spoils of the victor. But under the absolute monarchy, 
during the first Revolution, and under Napoleon the bureaucracy was only the 
means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Under the Restoration, 
 
timeless notion of command). But the state would soon absorb politics whole. In light of this, Donoso 
might be said to prefigure the Christian Anarchism of Jacques Ellul. 
172 Donoso Cortés, Despachos desde París (1851-1853), 835. Throughout the letter, Donoso draws a 
fascinating analogy between Julius Caesar and Augustus, and Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III, 
considering the forces that brought both families to power; Napoleon and Donoso became acquainted 
during the latter’s ambassadorship in Paris.  
173 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 90-93.  
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under Louis Philippe, under the parliamentary republic, it was the instrument of 
the ruling class, however much it strove for power of its own. Only under the 
second Bonaparte does the state seem to have made itself completely 
independent. The state machinery has so strengthened itself vis-à-vis civil 
society that [Napoleon III] suffices for its head—an adventurer dropped in from 
abroad, raised on the shoulders of a drunken soldiery which he bought with 
whisky and sausages and to which he has to keep throwing more sausages.174  
Thus, Marx believed that Napoleon’s “overthrow of the parliamentary republic 
contained within itself the germ of the triumph of the proletarian revolution,” to the 
extent that it coincided with the historical turning point at which the state gained 
independence from society, and subjected it.175  
In the Brumaire, Marx recounted an exclamation by Guizot, C’est le triomphe 
complet et définitif du Socialisme! Marx fundamentally agrees with Guizot’s 
characterization. He believed himself to be witnessing the definitive and complete 
downfall of bourgeois domination as the ineluctable course of dialectical materialism 
deterministically progressing through history. No one, however, recognized the 
downfall of continental parliamentary liberalism as early and profoundly as Donoso. 
Liberalism’s naive focus on institutional design and proceduralism could never placate 
the overwhelming appeal of socialism. Neither could a sociologically weakened 
Catholic Church, for the time being, with its otherworldly bias, calling for resignation 
at a time of vast material demands. Alternatively, 
...socialism affirms that man’s nature is healthy and society sick; when it sets the 
former in open war with the latter to extirpate the evil that is in it with the good 
that is in him; when it summons all men to rise up and rebel against all social 
institutions, there is no doubt that in this way of framing and resolving the 
question, if there is a lot that is false, there is something gigantic and grandiose, 
worthy of the terrible majesty of the matter.176 
Donoso foresaw that this colossal ideology would soon take hold of the High-Modernist State. 
 
174 Marx, The Eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 61-62. 
175 Marx, The Eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 61; Suárez is keen to point out that Donoso 
had widely anticipated Marx’s diagnosis of Louis Napoleon rise, “Marx wrote in 1852, after the fact, 
but Donoso announced it more than two years earlier, and even predicted the unviability of the 
monarchy, Louis Napoleon’s allergies to the Republic and, as a consequence of a process that Donoso 
had been describing in his dispatches to the Spanish government week after week, the proclamation of 
Empire.” Suárez, Vida y Obra de Juan Donoso Cortés, 917. 
176 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 599. 
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Revolution, Technology and the State 
Donoso’s Discurso sobre la situación de España captured the ideological 
climate conducive to the expansionist state. Donoso spoke hypothetically, as if from the 
perspective of a minister, 
To a universal responsibility corresponds an absolute power; because absolute 
power and universal responsibility are correlative things, forcefully correlative. 
An absolute power, to be so, needs to be an expedited power, and to be expedited 
it is necessary that it does not find resistances. Before gentlemen, there existed 
corporations united by the ties of love, united by the ties of religion; these 
corporations opposed a dyke to all despotisms that wanted to rise up in the nation; 
those corporations are not compatible with my responsibility, are not compatible 
with the expedition I need as responsible Minister; allow me to end with them. 
The naming of all public employees is a gigantic instrument of corruption, but it 
does not matter; if I do not name all public employees I can’t be responsible: if 
you demand my responsibility, give me the naming of all employees; Local life, 
municipal life, provincial life, can be good and excellent things; but if I am 
responsible for everything, only I shall live to do it all myself. By implication, 
centralization; apoplectic civilization; absolute centralization. All expedients 
must come to the Ministry, all the gold must come to the public Treasury. These 
are necessary consequences. By implication, if you accuse me of arbitrariness, I 
respond that it is you who have made me arbitrary, imposing upon me a 
responsibility that confers me an absolute power177 
Gallego García highlights the historical depth of Donoso’s oratory, “In this 
magnificent speech, Donoso synthesized the birth of the State and the natural growth of 
its power. And how the liberal State in its rationalist search for a simplifying geometry, 
far from limiting power, had taken it to its maximum historical expansion.”178 The logic 
of an idea advances relentlessly, leveraging technology, leveling resistances it finds 
along the way, pushing out from a statist center of power, asphyxiating vestiges of a 
world gone by between reason and the walls of society.  
Immersed in the moment, Donoso detected no backstops to the combination of 
socialism, technology and the state:  
In the ancient world tyranny was ferocious and devastating, however, this 
tyranny was limited physically, because all States were small and because 
international relations were impossible; consequently, in antiquity there could 
not be large scale tyrannies save one: that of Rome. But now gentlemen the tracks 
are prepared for a gigantic tyrant, colossal, universal, immense; all is prepared 
 
177 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la situación de España, 486 
178 Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 68. 
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for it...there are no resistances, physical nor moral; there are no physical 
resistances, because with steamboats and iron tracks there are no frontiers; there 
are no physical resistances, because with the electric telegraph there is no 
distance, and there are no moral resistances, because all the spirits are divided 
and all patriotisms are dead179 
In a rather obscure note by Donoso, we find that technological unity takes on the same 
sinister character.  Theology and biblical analogy are characteristically linked with the 
political, 
The world dreams of a certain gigantic unity that God does not see with good 
eyes, and that this Lord will not permit, because that unity would be the temple 
of pride...unity of codes, unity of trends, unity of civilization, administrative 
unity, commercial, industrial, literary and linguistic unity...the telegraph, the iron 
tracks, London’s democratic committee: see there three great symptoms of that 
revolution...But God will not permit a unity that is not the unity of the Cross. The 
democratic Babel will have the same fate as the Babel from the holy books180 
Donoso’s reflections pose the vast question of the causal relationship between 
ideology and technology. Robert Heilbroner approximated the issue in his renowned 
essay “Do machines make history?” Heilbroner, for one, adopted a soft technological 
determinism, whereby a technological base determined a social superstructure.181 
Likewise, Michael Oakeshott suggested that our technological advancement had created 
a context for optimism that replaced Christianity with a version of Pelagianism. Only 
later “the participation of government in a large share of this power was the common 
condition for the appearance of the politics of faith.”182 
Alternatively, Donoso seems to have been more of an idealist, meaning that ideas 
held independent causal power, and spurred particular technological orientations. In 
turn, this orientation had led to the formation of the high-modernist state. Thus, Donoso 
considered the relationship between ideology and technology and, in addition, political 
form. 
 On one occasion, he seemed to ascribe to the pursuit of repressive capacity 
power over the direction technological development. “Governments did not have 
enough with a million arms...a million eyes; they desired a million ears, and they had 
 
179 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 318. 
180 Donoso Cortés, Pensamientos varios, 981. 
181 Heilbroner, “Do Machines make history?”  
182 Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, 74. 
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them with administrative centralization...but this did not suffice because the religious 
thermometer kept going down...governments said ‘we need the privilege of being 
everywhere at once’ and they had it, and the telegraph was invented.”183 If we follow 
this line of reasoning, a particularly modern ideological framework sought to imbue the 
state with universal responsibility.184 An effective and efficient state required absolute 
power. In turn, the expectations of such state power demanded the development of 
technology necessary to bolster it. 
Another exponent of the notion that ideas ultimately hold sway over machines 
was the Christian anarchist Jacques Ellul. For Ellul, ideas like the rationalizing impulse 
conveyed by Donoso in the Discurso sobre la situación de España took hold of an age 
and pervaded above all else. Ellul underlined a key point found in Marx. While the 
working masses had looked at technology with some suspicion since the outset of the 
Industrial Revolution, Marxist ideology had managed to reconcile them to technology, 
incorporating the advances of “technique” into the narrative of material liberation.185 
Unlimited power as “anti-Christian power” 
Working within the tradition of Christian political thought, challenged by the 
technological leviathan, Donoso was preoccupied with the problem of the limitation of 
power. The key text to understand Donoso’s mature thinking on the matter is his 1852 
Carta al Director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes.’186   
In principle, Donoso believed that power was to be limited because “a Power 
without limits is a power that is essentially anti-Christian, and an affront to both the 
majesty of God and the dignity of man. A Power without limits can never be a ministry 
nor a service, and political Power, under the empire of Christian civilization, is no other 
 
183 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 318; The Crimean War (1853-1856), that occupied 
much of Donoso’s geopolitical thought, is commonly considered the first modern war. In it, the 
telegraph, steamboat, railway, and photography were deployed for the first time. 
184 Elsewhere, Donoso connected this conceit to the immanentist hubris of modernity, embodied by the 
socialists, “the rebel Proudhon,” and his Luciferian lineage. A more granular intellectual genealogy of 
modernity is found in Leo Strauss’ essay “The Three Waves of Modernity.” In Strauss’ interpretation, 
the expansion of statism and technique shared an arcane ideological ancestry. The project of the first 
wave, personified in Francis Bacon, was to control nature. The second wave, personified in Rousseau, 
continued the project, but redirected it from nature unto man himself.  
185 Ellul, The Technological Society. 
186 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 769. 
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thing.  A power without limits is, on the other hand, an idolatry, in the subject as well 
as in the king: in the subject because he adores the king; in the king, because he adores 
himself.”187 
Following his philosophy of limits, Donoso was an avid critic of the very 
absolutism he is superficially associated with by liberal historiography. While the 
historical emergence of absolute monarchy had desirably “conserved the unity and 
perpetuity of Power”, it had also “suppressed or despised resistances and hierarchies, 
and with this the law of God was violated.”188 
The metaphysical law that Donoso referred to is that of unity and variety. The 
Triune essence of God is reflected in all things: “in society, unity is manifest by means 
of Power, and variety, by means of hierarchies; Power and hierarchies, as well as the 
unity and variety they represent, are inviolable and sacred things, as their coexistence 
is at the same time the fulfillment of the law of God and by fiat the freedom of the 
people.”189 Absolute power was monolithic, recognizing neither authority nor 
hierarchies outside itself, and was therefore contrary to the normative power that the 
law of unity and variety commanded.  
In practice, the march of absolutism and the subsequent rise of voluntarist 
technological statism were levelling the rich tapestry of hierarchies in Donoso’s ideal 
political order.190 
By Donoso’s time, Montesquieu had already proposed a solution to the problem 
of the limitation of power. Famously, he had set out to divide and separate political 
power into three branches: executive, legislative and judicial. The doctrine was 
premised on setting the forces of the absolute state against itself. This was to be the 
surest guarantee of individual rights.  
Donoso regarded the renowned formula il faut que le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir 
as being insufficient. In pitting the forces of the state against each other, Donoso 
 
187 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 769-770. 
188Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 769. 
189 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 769.  
190 The advent of absolutism coincided with the “restoration of literary paganism and religious 
insurrection,” thus placing absolutism outside the Catholic tradition. Donoso Cortés, Carta al director 
de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 769; Quentin Skinner’s The Foundations of Modern Political Thought 
examines the connection between the Reformation and absolutism authoritatively. 
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considered that Montesquieu had capitulated to the assumptions and aspirations of 
absolutism vis-à-vis the state, that treated the latter as the repository of undelegated and 
unquestionable sovereignty.191 The absolute state had substituted the unlimited powers 
of the absolute monarch and the absolute sovereignty of the people had substituted the 
unlimited powers of the prince. 192 Thus, the state could not limit its expansion from 
within its own structure.193 
Not only had the doctrine of the separation of powers granted absolutism its 
assumptions and ambitions in theory, but it had also done so in practice. The division 
and equilibrium of powers it premised was de facto impossible. Donoso rejected it from 
an empirical standpoint as early as the Lecciones,  
There are no mixed Governments nor have they ever existed. The supposition of 
their existence rests on a principle that is false; in the principle of the equilibrium 
of powers...there are no examples of [equilibrium] at any period in history...The 
proclaimers of mixed government have always confused the coexistence of two 
weak elements with the dominant element.194 
In Donoso’s account, power was indivisible and concentrated at a single point in the 
body politic, irrespective of the concrete form of political power.195 For Donoso, that 
point was the government, or the executive branch in the context of Montesquieu’s 
model. Crucially, the locus of political decision-making had moved within the structure 
 
191 According to Professor Galvão de Sousa, Montesquieu’s juridico-political vision was already 
“compromised” by assuming centralist absolutism. Montesquieu had adopted an individualist 
anthropology, which led him to discard intermediate institutions. Galvão de Sousa, 115.  
192 A note on sovereignty. Donoso did not refer to abstract sovereignty again after the Lecciones.  Even 
there, the triple identity between sovereignty, intelligence—embodied in a concrete social class—and 
force, separated Donoso from abstract conceptions of sovereignty, starting with the doctrinaires 
themselves. Our intuition for the fading out of the concept of sovereignty in Donoso is that only God 
could fulfill the conditions of sovereignty: omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. 
Immanentizing sovereignty, as Donoso had, circumstantially, in the Lecciones, even if he had 
distinguished between absolute and relative forms of sovereignty, could only bring trouble. The heirs 
to Montesquieu’s project fundamentally accepted the premises of an immanent and absolute 
sovereignty, and only after had tried to divide it. But once these premises had been accepted, the project 
of limitation from within was helpless. After the Lecciones, Donoso became increasingly vigilant of the 
abstractions of what he called “philosophical civilization,” that opposed to “Catholic Civilization,” 
pursued knowledge independently of revelation. In Sevilla Andrés, Donoso’s “two Civilizations” 
parallel Augustine’s “two cities.” 
193 Arguably, the legislative branch is never engulfed by the state, as it remains open to the inputs of 
civil society through elected representatives. 
194 Donoso Cortés, Lecciones de Derecho Político, 309-310. 
195 In the words of Wilhelmsen “The metaphysic of Power in Donoso is backed by a historical 
phenomenology that vanquishes any illusion regarding the effective limitation of power from within its 
structure.” Wilhelmsen, “Donoso Cortés y el significado del poder político”, 723. 
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of the modern state. As the state crowded out everything outside itself, its power had 
become almost impossible to limit. In sum, Donoso believed that what had started as a 
positive description of the English system by Montesquieu had taken on normative force 
among continental theorists. In doing so, the new formulation of checks and balances 
conceded to absolutism its pretensions in theory and was an ineffective brake on power 
in practice.  
In the past, forms of political power had been resisted from without. According 
to the Brazilian jurist Galvão de Sousa, the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas exemplified 
a tradition of limited monarchy in Western Europe that “tempered” royal power by 
opposing it with aristocratic elements (feudalism and the privileges of nobility, clergy, 
university) as well as democratic elements (local and communal liberties, militia, and 
the privileges of corporations), all of which were felt in the Cortes or estates general.196 
Donoso, who appears to work within this tradition, thought that this configuration of 
political power was a more authentic form of mixed constitution or regime.197 He 
stressed the historical discontinuity between traditional “hierarchically organized 
material resistances” to power, namely, the Cortes or assemblies, and the liberal 
parliamentarism that replaced these earlier institutions in the XIX century. 
Parliamentarism had made the assembly the absolute font of sovereignty. This, to 
Donoso, was inadmissible, for the source of all authority could only be God. 
“Assemblies in those times,” says Donoso, referring to the traditional Cortes, “were 
never a power.”198 Rather, they were a true resistance. 
 Absolute monarchy had constituted a “negation of Christian monarchy in one 
fundamental condition,” insofar as it levelled divine variety as reflected in 
hierarchies.199 Parliamentarism was a “fatal reaction” to absolute monarchy. It negated 
Christian monarchy, not in one but “in essence and all its conditions,” 
 
196 Galvão de Sousa, Política e teoría do estado, 113. 
197 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 769. Donoso idealized hereditary 
monarchy, as it existed in the confines that separated feudal and absolute monarchy, as the “most perfect 
and final form of political power and social hierarchies.” And yet what set him apart from the 
reactionaries of his time is that he did not promulgate nor think that monarchical reinstitution was 
possible. This is the tragic mark of all of Donoso’s output. 
198 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 769. Donoso launches a frontal 
attack on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social-contractarianism. 
199 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 770. 
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[parliamentarism] negates it in its unity, because it converts into three what is 
one with the division of Powers; it negates it in its perpetuity, because it places 
its foundation in a contract, and no power is inadmissible if its foundation is 
variable; it negates it in its limitation, because the political trinity in which power 
resides, either does not act out of impotence, organic disease brought to it by 
division, or acts tyrannically, not recognizing outside of itself nor finding around 
itself any legitimate resistances. Finally, parliamentarism, that negates Christian 
monarchy in all the conditions of its unity, negates it also in its variety and all its 
conditions through the suppression of social hierarchies.200  
In an apparent paradox, what results from division of powers is a power that is 
at once potentially “impotent” and “tyrannical.” But it is very well possible that 
authority might be weakened while the state is strengthened to tyrannical proportions, 
insofar as every hierarchy outside the state that is animated by the principle of authority 
is trammeled. Donoso’s reasoning here is not far from the Soft Despotism described by 
Alexis de Tocqueville, to whom he is often compared.  
The path from atomization and homogenization, to liberal anarchy, and finally 
on to centralizing socialism is a gateway in Donoso. Similarly, Schmitt’s insight in 
Legality and Legitimacy was that “a pluralist party state becomes ‘total’ out of 
weakness, not out of strength and power. The state intervenes in every area of life, 
because it must fulfill the claims of all interested parties.”201 
 Of the four characteristics of power negated by parliamentarism (unity, variety, 
perpetuity and limitation), it is “limitation” that concerned Donoso the most, given the 
growth of power at the time. The emergence of the high-modernist state as a political 
category compounded the philosophical, political, and technical problem of its 
limitation. 
Faced with this challenge concerning limitation, we ought to distinguish between 
the dynamics of political power, and statism as a historical form of the political.202 
Conceptually, the modern nation-state as we know it only began to appear later in 
Donoso, often as part of his ominous predictions about centralization, ideology, and 
technology. Instead, government and monarchy feature prominently throughout his 
 
200 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’, 770. 
201 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 92. 
202 On this matter see, for example, Negro Pavón, Gobierno y estado. 
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work. That is because the Spanish state emerged before his eyes during the later years 
of his life, during the Decada Moderada.203   
This is the incipient power that Donoso felt was irresistible. Donoso’s historical 
vantage point allowed him to catch a glimpse of where Europe was heading. The social 
and technological conditions unfolding in 1848 exhausted Montesquieu’s project. 
Liberal parliamentarism, that had arisen through the Enlightenment as the modern 
backstop to counterbalance absolute monarchy, could not arrest the historical course of 
the voluntarist state.204  
Gallego García contends that, by the second and third decades of the twentieth 
century, “demagogic movements, in their voluntarist drift, began to sever the last walls 
that limited the power of human will.”205 Thus Wilfredo Pareto wondered “who still 
worries for the balance of powers? For the just equilibrium between the rights of the 
state and those of the individual?” In turn, Carl Schmitt identified the division of powers 
as “the strongest contradiction between liberalism and democracy.”206 For Schmitt, 
denying that  state power could concentrate in a single point contradicted the very 
definition of democracy as the identity between government and the governed.207 
The Limits of Tradition 
The political task at hand for Donoso was not only to limit the power of the rising 
technological leviathan, but to propose an attractive vision that could compete with the 
materialism and novelty of the utopian panaceas of the socialists. Graham captures 
Donoso’s aversion to a statecraft dominated by the new political economy, 
With his Southwestern rural origins and professional career, Donoso was ill 
prepared to understand or sympathize with an industrial revolution for the 
Northeast [Catalonia], but he did not really oppose it in itself. What worried him 
was the intense public response to this economic revolution, such as he observed 
in the great London Exhibition of 1851. He pleaded for a ‘balance between 
 
203 The modern nation-state was a work in progress in XIX century Spain. Before that, the political unit 
was the amalgam of the Spanish Monarchy. The rationalizing and centralizing dynamic of the modern 
state explains much of the Carlist Wars.  
204 In contrast we may consider the thought of contemporary democratic theorists such as Antonio 
García-Trevijano. For García-Trevijano, in a healthy liberal democracy, the legislative branch—
representative of the people—remained outside the structure of the state and controlled it. 
205 Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 39. 
206 Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 39. 
207 Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 39. 
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material interests and those which are moral and religious.’ It was not railways 
or industry he opposed but the spirit of materialism so evident in the avid pursuit 
of these things.208 
But the mismatch between Donoso’s vision of energetic but limited government and the 
“economic” century, to use Schmitt’s terminology, ran even deeper.209 According to 
Donoso’s own understanding of politics, defensive statecraft could not—and should 
not—attempt to recreate or offer substitutes for the moral, spiritual, and intellectual pre-
political substrate of Christendom. The task of government, we have seen, was to resist 
by shoring up historically rooted, concrete political institutions. 
Donoso’s prejudice is consistent with the timeless conservative attitude that 
while a rich civil society grows slowly from the ground up, it can easily be destroyed 
from the top down, 
...the absolute impotence that all equilibrist parties are condemned to in History, 
and...the great problem of conciliation between of the rights of the State with 
respect to the individuals and of order with liberty is still a problem...man cannot 
maintain the equilibrium of things if not by abstaining from laying his hands on 
them...the only peoples that have at once been respectful and free, the only 
government that have been commensurate and strong, are those in which the 
hand of man is not seen in which the institutions have been forming with that 
slow and progressive vegetation with which everything that is stable in the 
domains of time and History grows210 
The most important of those para-political institutions was the Church. Like 
Tocqueville, Donoso believed that freedom was an emergent property of religion. True 
religion was sustained and actualized across society by the Church. So long as the 
Church’s precepts are followed, “interior repression,” or government of the self, would 
make freedom possible.211 This is the essence of what has been called Donoso’s law of 
the thermometer,  
 
208 Graham, Donoso Cortés: Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist, 226. 
209 It was not for a lack of exposure or understanding to the problems of political  economy of the age. 
In fact, during his diplomatic mission to Prussia, Donoso dispatched on the Zollverein or German 
Customs Union in great detail. Some of these communications are compiled by Valverde in Donoso 
Cortés, Despachos desde Berlín (1849),  347-449. 
210 Donoso Cortés, Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo, 639; The French 
Hispanist Charles de Mazade identified parallels to Edmund Burke in this passage.  Suárez, Vida y Obra 
de Juan Donoso Cortés, 759. 
211 Evidently, freedom as understood by Donoso had little to do with the unabridged exercise of our will 
stopping short of the rights of others.  
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Gentlemen, there are no more than two repressions possible: one interior and 
another exterior, religious and political. Their nature is such that, when the 
religious thermometer is up, the thermometer of repression is down, and when 
the religious thermometer is down, the political thermometer, political 
repression, tyranny, is up. This is a law of humanity, a law of History.212  
Although Donoso desired the self-regulation of the social organism through religious 
renovation, the preservation of society’s integrity had come to the point of requiring 
strong defensive action by the government. But with the emergence of the state, by way 
of technological expansion, government action was turned into statist repression. Thus, 
Donoso felt trapped in the statist paradigm.  
Kennedy also hinted at the inadequacy of Donoso’s statecraft in response to the 
new forces at play in society,  
If there is any single concept that dominates the career of Donoso as servant of 
the state, it is certainly the idea of Power. His basic concern is with the function 
of Power in society. With a unique single-mindedness he concentrates all his 
interest in this factor which he regards as the sine qua non of society. He saw 
society, as he understood and valued it, threatened, and he saw the threat—
whether from absolutist followers of Don Carlos or liberal followers of 
Espartero—as being chiefly directed against power. All his intellectual and 
moral resources are consequently marshalled to repel the attack. His weakness is 
that the marshalling and of resources led him to neglect the importance of other 
factors in society—he never denied that there were others, but they never 
seriously engaged his attention.213 
 
In Kennedy’s analysis, one must substitute “power” for the principle of authority 
(insofar as we have distinguished the two throughout our study). Authority was the true 
axis around which Donoso’s life of statecraft revolved. We should also consider 
Donoso’s early death. If only Providence had granted him more time, Donoso may taken 
on the new economic, material, and technological forces in society and channeled them 
towards the canons of tradition, just as Christian Democracy set out to do shortly after 
his time. 
The Originality of Donoso 
Donoso was never ingenuous enough to think that pre-revolutionary history 
could be reinstated by decree. This would have made Donoso, mutatis mutandis, a 
 
212 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 316. 
213 Kennedy, “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State,” 554. 
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revolutionary per Huntington, a Pelagian per Oakeshott, and an immanentist per 
Augustine. 
 He was aware that the material and ideological conditions had changed radically 
and definitively. This is the insight that made Donoso a conservative pioneer in the eyes 
of Schmitt. Donoso surpasses de Maistre, to the extent that he “abandons legitimist 
argumentation and no longer formulates a political philosophy of Restoration, but a 
theory of dictatorship.”214  
We have already criticized Schmitt’s interpretation of Donosian dictatorship as 
being charged with political motivations. When Graham stated that, “[Donoso’s] two 
great speeches have survived misuse by exploiters of fascist mentality in the 1920s and 
1930s to become world classics of oratory,” he certainly had Schmitt in mind.215 
Notwithstanding, Schmitt was absolutely correct in raising the fact that Donoso was not 
a monarchical legitimist. He loyally served the Isabeline monarchy until his death, 
regarding it as the best actually existing political alternative, a vestige of the principle 
of authority, a lesser-evil, or all three. But all the while, Donoso foresaw that the throne 
no longer counted “El rey existe, el rey reina; pero no gobierna.”216 Thus, Donoso’s 
unique insight and projection into the future set him apart from the legitimist 
reactionaries.  
Donoso’s acute sense of political reality did not make space for nostalgia. In the 
words of Pastor Martínez, 
The American historian Peter Viereck...highlights the conservative originality, 
ability and subtlety of Donoso, but errs in considering him an eighty-eighter like 
[de Maistre and Bonald], that is, that he yearns and will look to return to the year 
before the Revolution in France. On the contrary, his theory of the 
counterrevolution is modern, bourgeois—not restorative of the Ancien 
Régime—which also differentiates him from Carlism in Spain.217 
Turning to the Carlist question again, Carlismo was a propertarian, agrarian and 
regional cause. It was essentially particularistic. Europe in 1848, however, was in a 
universalist iteration of the law of unity and variety. Accounts of the so-called “Spring 
 
214 Díez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario, 528. 
215 Graham, Donoso Cortés: Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist, 143. 
216 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre Europa, 459. 
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of Nations” tend to focus on the exaltation of national particularities and folklore, and 
ignore the underlying forces of centralization that were at work. From this point of view, 
the nation-state was fundamentally the level of politics at which centralization was 
taking place. Thus, we can imagine Donoso thinking that particularistic Carlismo, 
regardless of his personal inclinations, would soon be diluted into the political whole 
by the metaphysical force of the law of unity and diversity. 
Furthermore, as the title of Schmitt’s book suggests, Donoso would remain a 
thinker oriented to Europe. Certainly, this had not (and is not) always the case for 
Iberian conservatives, including Carlist traditionalists, who often identify Europe with 
the corrupting currents of Reformation and Revolution. Donoso had traveled and 
conducted state affairs extensively in the European centers of power of his time. Hence, 
he readily anticipated that mass urban and industrial society constituted a new 
paradigm.218 
Donoso’s renown Discurso de la dictadura, in which he offered a defense of 
limited dictatorship in the short run, cloaks a sense of futility amidst the vastness of the 
forces unleashed throughout Europe. Donoso’s characteristic embrace of a somber 
future make him original and prophetic at once. 
Reclaiming Cincinnatus 
In the 1849 Discurso sobre la dictadura, Donoso bolstered the rule of Ramón 
María Narváez, leader of the moderados, and head of the Spanish government since 
1847. General Narváez had repressed incipient revolts in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia 
and Seville. He had drawn upon the plenary powers previously granted to him by 
parliament to keep the peace. Donoso’s speech is a response to Manuel Cortina, the 
leader of the progressive opposition, who had strongly criticized Narváez’s actions.219  
We must recall the broader European context of the Discurso, including the 
uprising that forced Pius IX to flee Rome to the coastal town of Gaeta. “What has that 
 
218 “The cult of material interests, the gigantic development of industry, the daring flight of commerce 
and the discredit that abstract speculations have fallen under in Europe, are things that had to produce 
and have produced the decadence of political influence and the preponderance of mercantile interests.” 
Donoso Cortés, Despachos desde Berlín (1849), 421. 
219 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 305. 
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city where heroes, Caesars and Pontiffs have reigned done? It has exchanged the throne 
of the Pontiffs for that of the demagogues,” declared Donoso in the Discurso.220  
In 1849, French troops arrived to aid the papacy under the banner of Catholic 
restoration (and the auspices of Napoleon’s realpolitik).  Soon, they found themselves 
bombarding the Eternal City. The American chargé d’affaires in Rome wrote, 
The contest is no longer between one army and another...but it is a struggle that 
embraces a whole moral world of ideas, hopes and faith, that may have an echo 
in the most distant generations. The actual object of the intervention is shaking 
the edifice of the Catholic religion to its very foundations, crushing that faith in 
thousands of hearts.221 
Thus, while Donoso’s speech dealt with Narvaez’s rule most directly, Donoso was on 
the whole oriented to Rome. Rome’s was the most crucial in the wave of revolts across 
the continent, insofar as it activated Donoso’s universal political objective of preserving 
the freedom of the Roman Church. The circumstances under which Donoso supported 
Narvaéz’s use of plenary powers were, therefore, both particular and civilizational.222  
In the Discurso, Donoso presented a dichotomous choice to parliament between 
one of two dictatorships,  
The issue is to choose between the dictatorship that comes from below, and the 
dictatorship that comes from above: to choose the one that comes from above, 
because it come from cleaner and more serene regions; the issue is to choose, 
finally, between the dictatorship of the dagger or the dictatorship of the sabre: I 
choose the dictatorship of the sabre, because it is more noble.223 
All the while, he lamented the deeply flawed terms, imposed by circumstance, 
under which was forced to act, 
Gentlemen, if this were about a choice, a choice between liberty...and 
dictatorship, there would be no dissent; because who, being able to embrace 
liberty, bends the knee to dictatorship? But this is not the question. Liberty does 
not exist in Europe as a fact; the constitutional governments that represented it 
years back, are in most places not but a frame, a lifeless skeleton. Remember one 
thing, remember Imperial Rome. In Imperial Rome there exist all the Republican 
institutions: there exist the omnipotent dictators, the inviolable tribunes, there 
 
220 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 320. 
221 Kertzer, The Pope Who Would be King, loc. 236. 
222 It was truly a moment of European dimension and repercussion. As Graham notes, Metternich, 
Nicholas I, Pius IX, Louis Napoleon and even Montalembert, a liberal Catholic, took in the Discurso. 
Donoso’s concerns about the upheavals faced by Narvaéz were at once the concerns of virtually every 
European cabinet. Graham, Donoso Cortés: Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist, 150. 
223 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 323. 
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exist the senatorial families, there exist the eminent consuls...there is only one 
thing missing: there is excess of one man and the Republic is missing.224 
The terms in which Donoso set out the question are certainly arguable. Was the 
via media—the path that Donoso had so fruitfully followed to inaugurate the Decada 
Moderada—truly exhausted? Possibly. However, Donoso’s dictatorial option was 
inherently limited. 
If we have adequately conveyed the basis of Donoso’s statecraft so far, then it 
should be plain to see that dictatorship was not an ideal form of government for him, 
nor was any other form of government for that matter. Throughout Donoso’s work, 
political form is subordinate to political content. Thus, Donoso’s support was radically 
contingent upon the situation and the revolutionary challenge at hand in Europe and 
Spain.225 The exceptional powers granted to Narvaéz by parliament continued to be 
subject to circumstances and were limited by a temporal horizon.  
But Dictatorship was limited in a much more obvious sense, namely, in its 
capacity to bend the long arch of history. Ironically, to see in dictatorship or in any other 
institutional arrangement a permanent remedy to the ills of Europe, would be to follow 
the liberal school in their error. According to Donoso,  
when liberalism explains evil and good, order and disorder, by the different 
forms of government, all ephemeral and transitory; when, disregarding...all 
social problems, and all religious problems...it sets out to discuss political 
problems, as if they were the only ones worthy by their highness to occupy the 
Statesman...there are no words to describe...the profound incapacity and radical 
impotency of this school, not to resolve, but even to pose these dreadful 
questions. The liberal school...has ventured to govern without the people and 
God; an extravagant and impossible enterprise: its days are counted, because 
God is showing up by one point of the horizon, and the people by the other226 
For Donoso, Europe’s problem was primarily located in the soul, and not in particular 
institutional arrangements. He pressed that Europe’s moral substrate, of which political 
liberty was an emergent property, had tragically dried-up. Only its lifeless institutional 
carcass remained. The liberals’ obsession with proceduralism tended to disregard the 
underlying state of civilization, of which political reality could only be a reflection. One 
 
224 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la dictadura, 322. 
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thing alone could truly avert catastrophe: a religious reaction that Donoso nevertheless 
did not expect.227 Hence, there is an overwhelming pathos throughout the Discurso, 
arising from the realization that dictatorship left the deeper issues of social 
disintegration unaddressed.  
Graham has correctly captured both the necessary temporality of Donoso’s 
support for exceptional powers, and the need for moral reform in the long run, 
 In front of a nominally liberal Cortes, Donoso defied the principles of the 
Progressives and offered a reasoned defense of the legitimacy of dictatorship as 
a temporary safeguard for society against revolution. But besides upholding 
political reaction, he called for a general moral and religious reaction as the only 
permanent remedy against the disorder of revolutions and the tyranny of 
dictatorships.228 
Temporarily, however, following Graham’s reading, Donoso considered that “to 
stave off revolutions, governmental resistance was more effective than additional liberal 
concessions; Louis Philippe had fallen by not resisting, and Pius IX by granting 
concessions.”229 Thus, Donoso lent his support to Narváez with these precedents in 
mind. 
The historical sources and jurisprudence from which Donoso sought inspiration 
for the Discurso respond to limited conceptions of dictatorship. Donoso found 
“constitutional” precedents in Athens, Rome, and the neighboring France at the time of 
the Discurso. As Imatz points out, Donoso was not a theorist of dictatorship in the 
abstract. He was not a Lenin but a statesman in search of practical precedents of strong-
man rule. Imatz points out that Donoso found the best example in the commissary or 
delegated dictatorship of the Roman patrician Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus.230  
Dictatorship in Donoso’s policy playbook, inspired by the Roman institution, 
was less a theory than a “rational” and “legitimate” tool of government. If in the 
Lecciones government was “always and everywhere resisting,” in the Discurso, 
Cincinnatian dictatorship was the mode of resistance in times of emergency under great 
stress. Dictatorship remained within the immediate sphere of political praxis, rather than 
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in the most abstract regions of political philosophy that deal with questions of the 
legitimacy of political power. 
Crucially, and here we are getting at Schmitt’s misrepresentation, dictatorship 
was never a legitimating force in itself, ex nihilo. Schmitt considered Donoso a pioneer 
insofar as he was the first conservative to recognize the impending abolition, de facto, 
of the monarchy, and to consequently abandon the illusion of monarchical restoration 
as a political strategy. Like Donoso, Schmitt was no legitimist. But Schmitt went a step 
further, and posited that sovereign dictatorship was the only effective 
counterrevolutionary approach. He found intellectual armament in Donoso, who he 
made into a proto-decisionist.   
In the Discurso, there is an analogy between a miracle as an exceptional 
phenomenon in the natural order and dictatorship as an exceptional situation in the 
state.231 The suspension of the law was equivalent to the miraculous suspension of 
natural laws. But Schmitt identified the miracle not with dictatorship but with the 
“rupture of juridical continuity.”232 Theoretically, Schmitt interpreted this as a window 
of opportunity. With the law suspended, a non-normative, sovereign dictatorship could 
be actualized. The state is thus reduced to an act of the will: a pure decision. Hence, 
Schmitt’s famous dictum that the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”233 
Schmitt was all too eager to detect in Donoso traces of this “pure decision, that does not 
reason, nor discuss, nor justify itself, that is to say, created from nothing and 
absolute.”234 “[Donoso’s] decisionism is essentially dictatorship, not legitimacy.”235 
Erudite legal minds have devoted themselves to disentangling Donoso from 
Schmitt’s unorthodox reading.236 We do insist, however, on the importance of 
incorporating Donoso’s vocational crisis to any discussion of the Discurso. Donoso’s 
crisis comes across clearly in the series of private epistles we have collected in this 
study. Not least, in the unfinished manuscript that we have opened our investigation 
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with. Valverde dated it in 1850: the year after the Discurso. Its pages do not reveal a 
convinced decisionist, but of a Catholic and a statesman in doubt. The crucial context 
these epistles provide command explanatory power, also for the more theoretical 
debates on Donosian dictatorship.  
Aside from this, we are convinced, contra Schmitt, that Donoso never denigrated 
the importance of legitimacy in politics. In his case, that meant a specifically Christian 
idea of legitimacy: the existence of a higher ideal of absolute justice from which 
legitimacy was derived. This ideal existed beyond a transcendent limit to worldly 
politics that was lost to Schmitt. For Donoso, the source of Narvaéz’s government was 
legitimate. As were its actions. Both dimensions of government were legitimate insofar 
as they were conducive to the conservation of society. And this conservation was the 
normative requirement of authority that could ultimately be traced up the God beyond 
the transcendent limit.  
Thus, Donoso’s Discurso remained at all times within the philosophical limits 
he subjected his own statecraft to. His account of limits contrasts with the internal logic 
of an autonomous power born out of the will that fascinated Schmitt for its 
counterrevolutionary potential.  
Whom to serve 
To contain revolution, Donoso had to rely circumstantially on the repressive 
force of a rapidly metastasizing state. At the same time, he was aware that these forces 
would sustain tyranny in the near future.237 That was Donoso’s quandary. His internal 
struggle reached a high point in this memorable segment of the Discurso: 
When legality suffices to save society, [we shall uphold] legality; when it is not 
enough, dictatorship. Gentlemen, this tremendous word (it is indeed tremendous, 
but not as much as the word revolution, the most tremendous of all); I say that 
this tremendous word has been pronounced here today by a man known to all; 
this man is not made from the cloth of dictators. I was born to comprehend them, 
 
237 “The foundation, gentlemen, of all of your errors (addressing the benches on the left) consists of not 
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I was not born to imitate them. Two things are for me impossible: to condemn 
dictatorship and to exercise it. That is way I am incapacitated to govern; I cannot 
accept government in good conscience; I could not accept it without placing half 
of myself against the other half, without placing my instinct and my rationality 
at war.238 
Donoso was acutely aware of his sustained involvement with a government that 
was transforming into a political machine. In spite of this, Traditionalist critics of 
Donoso, themselves anti-statist, are generally not sensitive to his concerns about the 
growth of the state. Miguel Ayuso is keen to point out the effects Donoso’s rural but 
bourgeois extraction, liberal training, and Francophilia had on his outlook. Ayuso 
further suggests that Donoso could not understand Spain’s “genuine” non-statist 
tradition. For Ayuso, this can only mean embracing Carlisms’ authentic reaction against 
the Bourbons’ centralizing designs.239 For Bartyzel, had Donoso lived longer, he would 
have coherently arrived at Carlist positions.240 
But if we turn to Donoso’s statecraft, it is not clear whether Donoso is aligned 
with the state or with the principle of authority. His explicit suspicion of the build-up of 
state capacity around 1848, as well as the prospect of a socialist conquest of the state, 
point to the latter. Reflecting on the Discurso sobre la dictadura, Valverde argued that 
for Donoso, what legitimized dictatorship in exceptional circumstances was the absolute 
value of society.241 It was never the state, which was far from an absolute value to 
Donoso. 
Authority, government, and society are antecedent to and exist independently of 
the state in its modern configuration.242 All three bear the divine imprint, while the state, 
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when taken to be a human creation, does not. Dictatorship could be promoted, 
exceptionally, in relation to the principle of authority. In doing so, Donoso understood 
himself as serving society (by upholding authority through government action), and not 
the abstract idol of the state. The Discurso aimed to invest the government with 
commissarial dictatorial powers, not to legitimize the state. Considering this, the 
supposed contradiction between Donoso’s call for a delegated dictatorship, and his 
warning against the emergence of a technological leviathan, is resolved. In this regard, 
we can take the vast distribution and positive reception of the speech as a marker of its 
coherence. The distinction between the modern state and timeless principles of 
government thus appears to hold. 
In relation to this distinction, Gallego García’s exposition of Westemeyer’s 
Donoso Cortés, hombre de estado y teólogo is particularly interesting, 
Reflecting on Donoso’s rejection of the modern State, the [Westemeyer] even 
considers whether the Donosian political ideal is a society without State and 
government. If the State, for Donoso, is in effect the result of religious repulse, 
wouldn’t his ideal consist of a complete absence of it?...Westemeyer incurs, 
however, in the error of confusing State and Government, which Donoso did not. 
For [Donoso], government was as good and necessary as harmful and 
superfluous was the State. Government is a natural fact, the State is not. And it 
is this artificiality of the State, as the rationalist construct it is, what the thinker 
from Extremadura rejects in maturity.243 
Gallego García’s distinction between state and government further attenuates the 
tension generated by the political participation of Christians, which lay at the core of 
 
243 Gallego García, Estado de Disolución, 65; We may at this point resort again to Michael Oakeshott. 
On the issue of whether the political skepticism implies anarchism, Oakeshott said “The sceptical style 
of government is not anarchical: the extreme here is not ‘no-government,’ or even government reduced 
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does not need to be overwhelming in order to be strong: it is paramount because its activities are 
limited.” Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, 106. According to Oakeshott’s 
interpretation, Donoso’s energetic but limited understanding of statecraft is not only non-contradictory, 
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Donoso’s crisis. The distinction is also pertinent to our discussion of Kennedy’s 
“inconsistency” thesis, for Kennedy assumed the category of “state” anachronistically 
(it suffices to recall the title of his essay “Donoso Cortés as Servant of the State”), and 




IV. The Statecraft of Hopeful Pessimism  
During his final months, Donoso decided to remain in at his post as ambassador 
in Paris. He did so with serious reservations concerning the morality of Christian 
participation in government. Donoso even considered retiring into a religious life of 
contemplation. 
 We have alluded to Donoso’s letter to the Prussian diplomat Raczynski, in 
which Donoso explained that only he possessed the knowledge to continue the 
negotiations with the Americans and the French over Cuba. We can examine this 
decision from a short-term perspective. Thus, diligently accompanying the diplomatic 
talks to their conclusion was expedient and politically convenient. But we can also 
understand Donoso’s decision as a choice that is consonant with his rationale for 
statecraft. Specifically, the lower limit compelling him to uphold the governmental 
responsibilities he had assumed. 
From this perspective, Donoso’s decision reflects a lifelong process of 
discernment. The result of his practical reasoning was a positive answer to the problem 
of Christian participation in politics. As mentioned in our discussions of Machiavelli 
and Schmitt, Donoso refused to accumulate political power, at least if we take his 
Discurso sobre la dictadura at face value. In a sense, these two points of inflection—
the renunciation of power in the Discurso and his decision to remain in Paris—are 
representative of Donoso’s upper and lower limits of statecraft. Within these limits, 
between otherworldliness and affirmation, and between resignation and ambition, laid 
a delicate equilibrium that Christian statesmen must navigate. 
 Fortunately for us, the peaks of Donoso’s ambivalence, characterized by crisis, 
doubt, and contradiction, were succeeded by troughs in which he articulated a robust 
vision of Christian statecraft. In these more confident moments, Donoso penned his 
thoughts on the virtues that sustain statecraft. He often made them explicit in lesser-
known and rarely translated private correspondence. In the revolutionary moment, 
Donoso asserted the value of government service and duty. Ultimately, he was guided 




The dismal world unfolding around him never paralyzed a hopeful Donoso. He 
vindicated agency. Hope drew its infinite reserves from the potentiality of human 
freedom to reach for the good. In the Ensayo, he dedicated a chapter to “the free will of 
man,” in which he spoke of it as “the masterpiece of creation, and the most portentous, 
if it were licit to speak this way, of the divine portents. To it all things are invariably 
ordered, in such a manner in which creation would be inexplicable without man, and 
man would be inexplicable not being free.”244  Before that, in his articles on Pius IX, 
Donoso had noted that “the idea of freedom is founded on that of free will, and free will 
is not a discovery of philosophy; it is a fact revealed by God to the human race.”245  
Freedom is one of the two constitutive elements of Donoso’s theology of history. 
“Outside God’s action, there is nothing but the action of man, outside of divine 
providence, there is nothing but human freedom. The combination of this liberty with 
that providence constitutes the varied and rich plot of History,” asserted Donoso.246 
Together, human freedom and Providence unfold within Donoso’s particular 
cosmology. For Donoso “Creation is like a circle; God is, from one point of view, its 
circumference; from another point of view; its center; as its center, it attracts it; as 
circumference, it contains it, everything obeys this irresistible attraction.”247 The 
freedom of intelligent beings consists of oscillations within these vast providential 
limits that are both God. Throughout, Donoso’s theology echoes Augustine, who 
Donoso called “the most beautiful genius and the greatest of doctors,” and who had said 
“Poor mortal, do you wish to flee from God? Throw yourself in His arms.”248 
Donoso’s most abstract and remote metaphysical doctrines had real ethical and 
political implications. For Donoso, neutrality, indifference, or inaction in face of the 
Social Question was impossible, metaphysically impossible even: 
And do not tell me that you do not wish to combat; because in the instance in 
which you tell me, you are combating, nor that you ignore which side to incline 
towards, because in the very moment that you say that, you have inclined to a 
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side, nor affirm to me that you wish to be neutral, because when you think 
yourself so, you are no longer so; nor assure me that you will remain indifferent, 
because I will mock you, by pronouncing that word, you have already picked a 
party. Do not tire in seeking secure asylum against the scourge of war, because 
you tire vainly; that war stretches as much as space, and is prolonged as much as 
time. Only in eternity, fatherland of the just, can you find rest; there alone there 
is no combat; do not presume, however, that the doors of Eternity will be open 
to you unless you show the scars you carry; those gates do not open but for those 
who gloriously combated here the combats of the Lord, and those who go like 
the Lord, crucified”249 
There was a bias towards action in Donoso, to the point that truth and action 
seemed to converge. He railed against the neutralizing, paralyzing, and limitless 
discourse of what he called “philosophical civilization” and the “discussing class” 
whose home was late bourgeois liberal parliamentarism.250 
Thus, Donoso, despite his notoriously dire predictions, steered clear from crude 
historicism, as well as from a metaphysical fatalism that was essentially alien to the 
Christian faith. Complete resignation and indifference were contrary to Christian 
teaching. Freedom, in conjunction with Providence, made possible both the right 
theorization and the practice of a Christian statecraft.  
In an 1851 letter to Guizot, following the Latin maxim actiones secundum fidei, 
Donoso asserted that, 
the world shall not be saved by thought alone, but also through action, given that 
man only thinks to act later conforming to his thought. In order to be saved, the 
world needs truth and virtue. Now, the one and the other can only be obtained 
through the Church, here’s why: in the order of thought, only the Church is in 
possession of the absolute, in the order of action, only she is in possession of 
charity.251  
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exasperated Donoso, who saw in [continental liberalism] the seed of its self-destruction, because it was 
incapable of giving valid and definitive responses to the political and social questions.” Valverde, 
introduction to Obras completas de Juan Donoso Cortés, 124. For Donoso, socialism’s theological 
resolve was too vast to afford the paralyzing effects of discussion; Schmitt himself said that “Liberalism, 
with its contradictions and compromises, existed for Donoso Cortés only in that short interim period in 
which it was possible to answer the question ‘Christ or Barabbas?’ with a proposal to adjourn or appoint 
a commission of investigation.” Schmitt, Political Theology,  62. 




All the while, Donoso was aware of the steepness of the challenge before him. 
Writing as early as 1843, Donoso was aware of an epochal shift deeper than the political 
moment in Spain, 
...I do not ignore that the present generation, fed by the breasts of revolution, 
affirms everything that I deny and denies everything that I affirm. I know that it 
admits and proclaims as beyond doubt the principle of the indefinite 
perfectibility of society and Man, when I take it that Humanity is identical to 
itself en all the prolongation of time; that since the beginning of things to until 
the consummation of centuries it is subject to the same laws, the same changes, 
the same growth and the same declination...I know that vapor, miracle of 
industry, does not suppress distance, or is the most powerful agent of business 
between peoples, but by extinguishing little by little patriotism in the nations; I 
know that that which we gains in culture we lose in innocence...I know that 
philosophy ends with faith, and that the principles that today govern society do 
not attain domination  if not because their ascendant movement corresponds to 
the rapid and simultaneous declination of all moral principles...I know all of this 
and yet there is a voice within me that rises up and my spirit listens to, that brings 
me to take on the great enterprise of this pathetic history252 
Disregarding societal trends to proclaim the unchanging truth was a “holy duty” 
for Donoso. He asserted that “even if the triumph of the ideas I proclaim is impossible 
in the current times”, it is “necessary to clear the path so that they may reach empire” 
in better days. “The triumph of error can be as long as disastrous, but it is never 
definitive or eternal. The light of truth can suffer from eclipses, and those who confess 
it may receive the crown of martyrdom or drag the chain of tribulation; but the truth, 
daughter of God, is queen of the world.”253 
Donoso’s existential attitude is reflected further in a May 1849 letter to Charles 
de Montalembert. It appears right after the Discurso sobre la dictadura in Valverde’s 
Obras Completas, as part of a compilation of the correspondence that followed the 
momentous speech. In it, Donoso exclaims, 
Don’t tell me that, if expiration is certain, the fight is excused; because in the 
first place, the fight can adjourn catastrophe, and in the second place, the fight is 
a duty and not speculation to those that pride ourselves as Catholics. Let us thank 
God for having granted us the combat, and let us ask not above the grace of 
 
252 Donoso Cortés, Historia de la regencia de María Cristina, 936. 
253 Donoso Cortés, Historia de la regencia de María Cristina, 936. 
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combat for the grace of triumph to he who in his infinite goodness reserves to 
who combat well for his cause a reward greater than victory254  
Reflecting on this letter, Sevilla Andrés concludes that, 
 being a providentialist, Donoso could not be absolutely desperate nor 
disillusioned with the possibilities of man. There is a certain optimism in the first 
writings of our author and a tremendous epochal disillusionment around 1848. 
The letter to Montalembert...in which the triumph of good over evil by the direct 
intervention of Providence is expected, does not, however, leave the care of the 
fight to [Providence] alone, but it calls man to a combat that he must feel as an 
obligation.255 
Service 
Donoso conceived statecraft in the spirit of service and obligation. Government 
was, quite literally, his ligature. In the following passage, Donoso imagines himself 
enmeshed in the hierarchical fabric of Creation, where the ligature of government is his 
“political bond,”  
Philosophical civilization teaches that the nature of man is full and healthy: 
healthy and full in a radical way in its essence and its constitutive elements. 
Man’s understanding being healthy, he can see the truth, discover it and invent 
it; the will being healthy, he desires the good and does good naturally...it is clear 
that reason will get to know the truth, all of the truth, abandoned to itself, and 
that the will, abandoned to itself, will forcefully realize absolute good. This being 
so, it is clear that the solution to the great social problem lies with breaking all 
the ligatures that compress and hold human reason and the free will of man; evil 
is not in this free will or reason, but in those ligatures. If evil consists in having 
ligatures, and good in not having them, perfection will consist in not having any 
of any kind. If this is so, humanity will be perfect when it negates God, that is its 
divine ligature, and when it negates Government, that is its political ligature, and 
when it negates property, that is its social ligature, and when it negates family, 
which is its domestic ligature (emphasis added).256 
Donoso had discerned and pursued his vocation of government service at a young age. 
Thereafter, this political ligature worked as the lower limit of statecraft, obliging him to 
government action, that is, to resistance. Among the various factors explaining 
Donoso’s decision to remain in Paris, his statement of government as a divine ligature 
stands out. Government was, nonetheless, only one of the natural ligatures found in the 
 
254 Donoso Cortés, Cartas al conde de Montalembert, 327. 
255 Sevilla Andrés, “El pensamiento internacional de Donoso Cortés,” 186. 
256 Donoso Cortés, Cartas al conde de Montalembert, 325.  
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social organism, alongside God, family and property. Political action was far from 
comprehensive or totalizing.257 
Throughout Donoso’s work, government implied a spirit of service to the social 
whole.258 In his 1850 Discurso sobre la situación de España, the last in his great trilogy, 
Donoso stated that “public ministry is not a sinecure; it is a service, and a tragic service. 
To govern is not to be served; it is to serve, not to revel; it’s to row, and to live, and to 
die hand on the oar. That is the price that ought to be for those who want to be ministers, 
and only those who are so at that price, are truthfully so.”259 In his letter to Cardinal 
Fornari, he had posited that Catholicism had “taught the peoples that no man has right 
above another man, because all authority comes from God; that no one who is not small 
in his own eyes, will be great; that powers are instituted for good; that to rule is to serve, 
that Principality is a ministry, and consequently a sacrifice.”260  
We have already noted how in his letter to the director of the Revue de Deux 
Mondes,  Donoso insisted that “a Power without limits can never be a ministry nor a 
service, and political Power, under the empire of Christian civilization, is no other 
thing.”261 Indeed, the theme of government as service is evocative of the Papal title 
Servus Servorum Dei, or servant of the servants of God.  
The spirit of service is the corollary of humility. Only the humble can truly serve. 
“What are, according to Donoso Cortés, the ideas madre with which Christianity has 
civilized society?” asks Valverde. “The first is—as strange as it may seem—the idea of 
humility.”262  
 
257 Donoso’s world of ligatures was a world of accepted limits, many of which lay beyond his will. In 
vindicating them, he took on characteristics of the Homeric hero Odysseus, as described by Patrick 
Deneen in The Odyssey of Political Theory. Donoso recognized the power growing around him, that 
like Calypso promised to deliver man from his limits, and renounced it, accepting Death, “the final 
limit.” Deenen, The Odyssey of Political Theory, 232-237. 
258 This disposition can be found in the Gospel of Matthew “But Jesus summoned them and said, ‘You 
know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and the great ones make their authority over them 
felt. But it shall not be so among you. Rather, whoever wishes to be great among you shall be your 
servant; whoever wishes to be first among you shall be your slave.’” Matt. 20:25-27.  
259 Donoso Cortés, Discurso sobre la situación de España, 495. 
260 Donoso Cortés, Carta al Cardenal Fornari, 751. 
261 Donoso Cortés, Carta al director de la ‘Revue des Deux Mondes,’ 769-770. 
262 Valverde, introduction to Obras completas de Juan Donoso Cortés, 151. 
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Winning the Long Defeat 
 Far from dissolving himself into an empty, nihilistic era, Donoso found meaning 
in the strife of statecraft. This search presented a theological problem. Donoso had to 
reconcile a pervasive and benevolent Providence to the existence cataclysm of 
revolution. Thus, through his preferred lens, the theology of history, Donoso set out to 
build a theodicy of revolution. In his letter to Montalembert, Donoso explained that, 
Revolutions are the lanterns of Providence and History; of those who have had 
the fortune or the disgrace of living and dying in restful and peaceful times, it 
can be said that they have gone through life, and reached death, without leaving 
infancy. Only those that, like us, live in the middle of the storm, can dress with 
the toga of virility and say of themselves that they are men. Revolutions are, from 
a certain point of view and up to a point, good like heresies, because they confirm 
and clarify the faith. I had never comprehended Lucifer’s gigantic rebellion, until 
I saw with my own eyes the senseless pride of Proudhon; human blindness has 
almost ceased to be a mystery given the incurable and supernatural blindness of 
the affluent classes. With respect to the dogma of the inherent perversion of 
human nature and its inclination to evil, who shall doubt it after looking to the 
socialist phalanxes?263  
On another occasion, Donoso writes to Isabella II, “when social transformations 
are deep, radical, universal, and simultaneous...they draw their source from further off 
and higher up...they have their source in God and their preparation in history, since 
those are precisely the marks which serve to distinguish the works of God from those 
of men.”264 Both times, Donoso’s language is reminiscent of  John the Baptist’s 
eschatological imagery collected in the Gospel of Matthew, by which the wheat is 
separated from the chaff.265 Thus, for Donoso, revolutions took on providential 
significance as a testing ground for the faithful in the Christian drama of Creation, 
history and humankind.  
Amidst revolution, Donoso’s definitive resolve was grounded in his self-
awareness as an actor, at once minuscule and transcendental, in the master narrative of 
a personal God who alone could conquer the mundane. Affirming himself in this faith, 
 
263 Donoso Cortés, Cartas al conde de Montalembert, 328. 
264  Graham, Donoso Cortés: Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist,  144. 




Donoso held on to the lost position in Paris, until his end, in the twilight of empire, and 
at the dawn of Marx’s revolutionary era. 
Beforehand, Donoso poured his fundamental disposition into his polemic with 
the Spanish press following the Discurso sobre la dictadura, “All my doctrine is here: 
the natural triumph of evil over good and the supernatural triumph of God over evil.”266 
Donoso’s genuine hope was eschatological. It is fitting to conclude by evoking another 
great Catholic imagination in modern history, J. R. R. Tolkien, who wrote: “Actually I 
am a Christian, and indeed a Roman Catholic, so that I do not expect ‘history’ to be 








266 Donoso Cortés, Polémica con la prensa española, 337. 
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